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3Introduction
The potency of the contention that fair trade or level playing fields
constitute a precondition for Free Trade and that, therefore, harmonization of
domestic policies across trading countries is necessary before Free Trade can be
embraced to one's advantage, should not be underestimated today. It is nowhere
more manifest, and compelling in its policy appeal, than in the area of
environmental standards.
Both the general view that cross-country intra-industry (CCII)
harmonization of environmental standards is required if Free Trade is to be
implemented, and the specific proposals currently in vogue to implement this
view, are therefore in need of analytical scrutiny.1 This is the task that we
undertake primarily in the present paper.
Section I briefly reviews the factors that drive the demands for cross-
country intra-industry harmonization of environmental standards and the specific
proposals, in particular the countervailing of so-called "social dumping" when
harmonization does not obtain but Free Trade does. Its main purpose, however,
is to categorize the (four) main issues that arise as the "high standards" and
"low standards" countries engage in freer trade and contemplate consequences of
the differences in their environmental standards when the pollution involved is
purely domestic.
Section II sets forth several basic theoretical propositions (derived from
the theoretical Appendix), concerning optimal commercial and environmental
policies under different circumstances when the environmental problem is purely
*By CCII, we mean harmonization of standards within the same industry
across different trading countries.
4domestic. In light thereof, the basic legitimacy and desirability of free trade
with diversity of domestic environmental standards is established. Also, a
detailed examination of two (of the four) issues distinguished in Section I is
offered: relating to the objections to diversity under free trade, reflecting
fears of unfair trade and the loss of one's High Standards.
Section III considers the related but distinct problems raised by concerns
with ethical preferences or "values" that result in objections to free trade with
diverse standards.
Section IV addresses the concern that current institutional mechanisms for
overseeing free trade, chiefly the GATT and its successor WTO, threaten High
Standards by permitting successful challenges by Low Standards countries on
diverse grounds reflecting mainly their market-disruption potential.
While these analyses concern the issues arising from purely domestic
environmental problems, Section V concludes by sketching the trade problems that
differentially arise when the environmental problems are international (or
"global"), i.e. they involve transborder externalities.
I. Demands for Cross-Countrv Intra-Industry Harmonization
of Environmental Standards; Categorizing the Issues
for Purely Domestic Environmental Problems
In reviewing and assessing the demands for CCII harmonization of
environmental standards, it is customary now to make a distinction of analytical
importance between (i) environmental problems that are intrinsically domestic in
nature (though they may be "internationalised" for reasons we will discuss); and
(ii) those that are intrinsically international in nature because they inherently
involve "physical" spillovers across national borders.
5Thus, if India pollutes a lake that is wholly within its borders, that is
an intrinsically domestic question. If, however, she pollutes a river that flows
into Bangladesh, that is an intrinsically international question. So are the
well-known problems of acid rain, ozone layer depletion and global warming.
These latter, intrinsically-international problems of the environment raise
questions that interface with the trade questions both in common and in different
ways from the former, intrinsically-domestic problems.
It has become commonplace among some environmentalists to assert that this
distinction is of no consequence because the intrinsically-domestic environmental
problems are increasingly seen to have transnational impacts. Science has shown,
for instance, that aerosol sprays are not just an environmental nuisance where
used; they endanger the planet! But the fact that science seems occasionally to
turn local (and partial-equilibrium) environmental impacts into transnational
(and general-equilibrium) impacts, is no proof that the former are an empty set.
We should not be deterred therefore from using this important conceptual
distinction.
A. Objections to Diversity of Standards
It would seem, at first glance, that at least the intrinsically-domestic
environmental problems should be matters best left by governments to domestic
solutions and within domestic jurisdiction (although transnational, global
"educational" and lobbying activities by environmental nongovernmental
organisations, the NGOs, are compatible with this solution). Why should anyone
object to the conduct of Free Trade with any country on the ground that her
preferred environmental choices and solutions (by way of setting pollution
standards and taxes) to intrinsically-domestic questions are unacceptable because
6they are incompatible with the case for (gains from) Free Trade? Yet, the fact
is that they do.
And the objections are directed, not merely at Free Trade, but also at the
institutional safeguards and practices, as at the GATT, which are designed to
ensure the proper functioning of an open, multilateral trading system that
embodies the principles of Free Trade. These objections take mainly four forms:
1. Unfair Trade: If you do something different, and especially if you do
what appears to be less, concerning environment than I do in the same industry
or sector, this is considered to be tantamount to lack of "level playing fields"
and therefore amounts to "unfair trade" by you. Free Trade, according to this
doctrine, is then unacceptable as it requires, as a precondition, "Fair Trade".2
2. Losing Higher Standards: Then again, the flip side of the "Fair Trade"
argument is the environmentalists' fear that if Free Trade occurs with countries
having "lower" environmental standards, no matter what the justification for this
situation, the effect will be to lower their own standards. This will follow
from the political pressure brought to bear on governments to lower standards to
ensure the survival of their industry.
An associated argument is that capital will move to countries with lower
standards, so that countries will engage in a "race to the bottom," each winding
up with lower standards than desired because standards are lowered to attract
capital from each other.
3. Conflicting Ethical Preferences: Environmentalists also often want at
times to impose their ethical preferences, considered "morally superior", on
other nations. Free Trade in products that offend one's moral sense (either in
themselves, or because of the way in which they are produced as in the use of
2This, of course, is the central issue addressed later in this paper.
7purse-seine nets in catching tuna or the leghold traps in hunting for fur) is
then considered objectionable because either trade in such products should be
withheld so as to induce or coerce acceptance of such preferences or such trade
should be abandoned, even if it has no effective consequence and might even hurt
only oneself, simply because "one should have no truck with the devil."3
The former argument presumes higher morality in one's behalf, which should
be spread to other nations with lower morality (and with corresponding lack of
standards/laws therefore to reflect the higher morality). The latter argument
seeks no such morally-imperial outreach; it simply wants no part in complicity
with lower morality elsewhere via participating in gainful free trade with
nations guilty of tolerating such lower morality. In either case, the diversity
of standards is considered then to be incompatible with the pursuit of free
trade.
4. Institutional Vulnerability of High Standards to Countries with Low
Standards Fearing Protectionism: Then, finally, the environmentalists fear that
they will lose their High Standards, not because market forces under free trade
bias the domestic political equilibrium in favour of lower standards or generate
a race to the bottom*, but because the current "institutional arrangements, at
the GATT in particular, enable the Low Standards countries to object to, and
threaten, the High Standards in other countries by claiming protectionist intent
or consequences, for instance.5
3The suspension of trade generally, i.e. the use of trade "sanctions" (to
promote human rights, for instance) is a related but different issue which we
do not discuss in this paper in depth.
4As in argument 2 above.
5The difficulties posed by the GATT, and now the WTO, for the
environmentalists extend to GATT law, i.e. Dispute Settlement Panel findings,
in regard to the ethical-preference issue as well. The general issue of GATT
8B. The Political Salience of these Objections
Thus, just consider why the first argument concerning the unfair trade of
lower CC11 standards elsewhere has become such a politically salient issue today.
While we turn to this argument in greater depth in Section II below, it should
suffice to note here that the fear is that competition will be greater if a rival
abroad faces lower burdens of environmental regulations and hence the argument
follows that this competitive advantage enjoyed by one's foreign rivals is
illegitimate and must be countervailed, much like dumping or subsidization is,
or must be eliminated at the source.
Thus, Senator Boren, who introduced legislation in US Congress to
countervail the "social dumping" allegedly resulting from lower standards abroad,
proposed such a measure on the ground that6
We can no longer stand idly by while some US
manufacturers, such as the US carbon and steel alloy
industry, spend as much as 250 percent more on
environmental controls as a percentage of gross domestic
product than do other countries... I see the unfair
advantage enjoyed by other nations exploiting the
environment and public health for economic gain when I
look at many industries important to my own state of
Oklahoma...
We will argue, in Section II, that environmental diversity is, contrary to
these assertions, perfectly legitimate, that it can arise not merely because the
environment is differently valued between countries in the sense that the utility
function defined on income and pollution is not identical and homothetic, but
also because of differences in endowments and technology across countries.
Hence, the common presumption driving harmonization and (alternatively) "social-
law on the entire range of relevant questions concerning the environment is
addressed by Frieder Roessler in his paper for this Project.
international Pollution Deterrence Act of 1991. Statement of Senator
David L. Boren, Senate Finance Committee, October 25, 1991.
9dumping"-countervailing demands, that others with different CCII standards are
illegitimately and unfairly reducing their costs, is untenable.7
Nonetheless, these demands are part of a general shift to demands to
harmonize a great, and possibly increasing, number of domestic policies: in
labour standards, in technology policy etc. Why?8
With industries everywhere increasingly open to competition, thanks
precisely to our postwar success in dismantling trade barriers, with
multinationals spreading technology freely across countries through direct
investments, and with capital more free than ever to move across countries,
producers face now the prospect that their competitive advantage is fragile and
that more industries than ever before are "footloose". There is therefore much
more sensitivity to any advantage that one's rivals abroad may enjoy in world
competition, and a propensity therefore to look over their shoulders to find
reasons why their advantage is "unfair".
The notion of unfairness is also attractive to those who seek relief from
international competition. If you go to your Congresswoman and ask for
protection because the competition is tough, it is going to be difficult to get
it. After all, many of them have been sufficiently educated, or perhaps
brainwashed (depending on your point of view), into thinking that protection,
while not a four-letter word, is not something you want to embrace if you aspire
to anything like statesmanship. But if you go to her and say that your
7We will be considering several objections to this view, of course,
before reaching this conclusion.
8The entire range of the factors (philosophical, economic and political)
that are currently prompting the drive towards CCII harmonization is reviewed
and synthesized in Bhagwati, "Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity among
Trading Nations," mimeo, Columbia, 1994, also prepared for this Project. See
also the discussion in Daniel Esty, Greening the GATT. Institute for
International Economics, Washington, D.C., 1994, pp. 108-114; 156-67.
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successful rival is playing by "unfair11 rules, you are going to do better. In
the United States, in particular, the "unfairness" notion can take you really far
since the economic and social ethos reflects notions of fairness and equality of
access (rather than success) more than anywhere else.
The fact that the United States also went through the "diminished giant"
syndrome vis-a-vis the Pacific nations which fed her fear of consequent
deindustrialization, also made the American politicians more susceptible during
the 1980's to these "unfair trade" arguments from interested lobbies. The
continuing dominance of the United States in setting the world's trading agenda
powerfully reinforces, in turn, the trend towards "fair trade" and "level playing
fields".
While the "unfair trade" argument for rejecting free trade with countries
with different environmental standards is therefore part of the generic and more
general demands for harmonization and level playing fields in world trade,
environment (whose protection is legitimately a virtue in itself) brings to this
trend yet added arguments with perhaps even more powerful appeal. Chief among
them is the fear, leading to the second argument listed above, that competition
with the imports and exports in third markets from countries with lower standards
will put pressure on domestic industries, triggering political action by them to
lower standards down to the levels abroad.
Believing (possibly with justification) that US Vice President Quayle's
Competitiveness Council was doing precisely this under the Bush administration,
the environmental NGOs in the United States, and their friends in the European
Community and elsewhere, came to see this as a real threat to their goals if free
trade is embraced and if harmonization up. is not imposed simultaneously by
coercion on foreign countries, especially the poor ones. As Walter Russell Mead
11
put it in a much cited article in Harper's Magazine:9
Either the progressive systems of the advanced
industrial countries will spread into the developing
world or the Third World will move north. Either
Mexican wages will move up or American wages will move
down. Environmentalists, labor unions, consumer groups,
and human-rights groups must go global--just as
corporations have done.
This concern reflects at the global level the debate within the EC: the fear that
the Common Market's free trade and free capital flows will lead to harmonization
down of standards "from below" and the efforts by many in consequence to impose
harmonization at a higher level of standards "from the top".
Finally, the demands for CCII harmonization are fed also by the feared
adverse effects of free trade and capital flows on the real wages of workers: an
issue that became important in the last Presidential election in the United
States. The Clinton campaign focused, not just on the failure of the Bush
administration to revive the economy. It also made much of the so-called
"structural" problem which is defined by the stagnation of real wages of the
unskilled workers during the 1980's. At least one of the candidates for
explaining this phenomenon has been the integration of the world economy and the
competition in consequence with poor countries with abundant unskilled labour.
We doubt the importance of this explanation10 but it has powerful appeal.
The attempts at globalizing the higher environmental and labour standards, with
the latter coming uncomfortably close to attempts at also raising wages in the
9
"Bushism, Found: A Second-Term Agenda Hidden in Trade Agreements,"
Harper's Magazine. September 1992, p. 44.
10Cf. J. Bhagwati and M. Kosters (ed.), Trade and Wages. American
Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C., 1994. Several trade economists share
this skeptical view; see the most recent review in Jagdish Bhagwati, "Trade
and Wages: Choosing Among Alternative Explanations," Federal Reserve Bank of
New York Economic Policy Review. January 1995.
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industrial sectors of the poor countries on human-rights and labour-rights
grounds, can be seen in fact as indirect ways of trying to reduce the perceived
threat to real wages of the unskilled in rich countries from free trade with (and
capital outflows to) the poor countries.
We may remark that, if the argument about the adverse effect of trade on
wages of the unskilled is really bought, we are back to the old concerns that
free trade with the poor countries will truly act like free immigration from
them: the immigration would directly depress workers' wages, free trade would
indirectly do so. Interestingly, in the animated British debate prior to the
passage of the 1905 Immigration Act, the free traders were also free
immigrationists, and the protectionists were also for restrictions on
immigration. Immigration was even described as Free Trade in Paupers!11
Hence, the growing sentiment that Free Trade with the poor countries will
increasingly depress rich countries' real wages should eventually lead to, not
just palliatives like the imposition of harmonized-up environmental and labour
standards, and attempts at restricting capital outflows (synonymous in politics
with "losing jobs") to them by way of Direct Foreign Investment. We predict that
we will also witness increasing attempts at encouraging population control in
these countries.12
nCf. J. Bhagwati, "Free Traders and Free Immigrationists: Friends or
Foes?,11 Russell Sage Foundation, New York, mimeo. 1992.
12The prominent US role in the UN Conference on Population in Cairo in
September 1994 may be explained, at least in part, in this fashion.
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II. The Case for Free Trade with Diversity of Environmental Standards
We now argue (based on the theoretical analysis in the Appendix) that the
case for Free Trade, with diversity of environmental standards across countries,
is essentially robust. We then proceed to address specifically the two issues
distinguished at the beginning of this paper: unfair trade and fear of loss of
higher standards.
At the outset, note that "standards" may refer either to the general
principles such as the "polluter pays" principle; or they may be defined as the
precise tax rates that are levied on the polluter. In the political debate over
differential standards, and the demands for CCII harmonization or for "eco-
dumping" duties when harmonization does not obtain, the complaints are evidently
against lower pollution tax rates or charges: e.g. that widget manufacturers are
taxed, for the effluents that they discharge, at lower tax rates in Mexico than
in the U.S. That defines therefore the sense in which we will discuss CCII
harmonization below, unless otherwise specified.
A. The Basic Theoretical Presumptions
Distinguish again between the two major cases: where the pollution is
domestic and where it is global (and spills over across national borders). Then,
the following basic theoretical conclusions follow (Appendix), defining welfare
in the conventional economic sense.
Domestic Pollution:
1. For a small country (with no influence on her terms of trade), free
trade remains the best policy, with its own pollution being taxed as required,
14
and regardless of whether the other country fixes its own pollution.13 Where
abatement is feasible with spending, there is no case for a subsidy.1*
2. For a small country, if its own pollution is not taxed optimally, free
trade will generally cease to be optimal. Also, it follows equally from the
postwar theory of commercial policy under distortions that free trade, with
domestic distortions, can immiserize.15
3. For a large country, free trade is not an optimal policy but an optimal
tariff is (on the assumption that there is no retaliation), while its domestic
pollution is directly fixed through a pollution tax. As is well known, such an
optimal solution for the large country is not Pareto Optimal for the world
economy.16
4. With free trade between two countries (small or large) and optimal
pollution taxes with each country, global Pareto Optimality will follow.
5. However, generally speaking, the optimal pollution taxes (in a globally
Pareto Optimal solution) will not be equal across the countries: diversity in
these tax rates will be both natural and appropriate, hence also "legitimate."
6. Imposing one country's pollution tax rates on another will then be to
create an inefficient, globally Pareto sub-optimal solution.
7. Such harmonization, or "straitjacketing" to be more accurate, of the
13Cf. Section IA, Appendix.
uCf. Section IB, Appendix.
15Thus, any unfixed domestic distortion, such as failure to have optimal
pollution taxes or adequate institutional arrangements to prevent the overuse
of commons, for instance, can lead to immiseration under free trade vis-a-vis
autarky. Cf. the review in Bhagwati, "The Generalized Theory of Distortions
and Welfare," in J. Bhagwati, R. Jones, R. Mundell and J. Vanek (eds.), Trade
Balance of Payments and Growth. North Holland: Amsterdam, 1971. Also see the
recent writings of Chichilinsky, Lloyd etc. on this question.
16Cf. Section IIB, Appendix.
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other country's standards towards one's own will also necessarily harm the other
country. Thus, a lower standard country, forced to "harmonize up," will be
harmed.
8. whether such "harmonization up" will benefit the higher standard
country is, however, problematic: it may help or harm.17 The presumption that
it will necessarily help is false.
Global Pollution
1. When global pollution occurs, the globally Pareto Optimal solution will
be characterized by free trade and by pollution taxes in each country producing
the pollution, these taxes being different except in singular circumstances.18
2. The globally Pareto Optimal solution is not necessarily equitable. To
be equitable as well, the market solution must be generally supplemented by (lump
sum) transfers.19
3. A small country, taking the foreign terms of trade, tariffs and
pollution abatement as given, will continue to find free trade to be its optimal
policy. It will combine this with optimal pollution taxes and abatement
addressed to its own pollution.20 But such Cournot behavior makes little sense:
it is more likely that each small country will "free ride" on pollution taxes and
abatement and reproduce the "tragedy of the commons" in the use of the common
17Cf. the contribution of D. Brown, A. Deardorff and R. Stern to this
Project. The answer eventually depends on how the offer curve of the lower
standard country shifts with the harmonization up.
18The conditions under which tax harmonization will occur in a globally
Pareto Optimal solution are discussed in Section V of Appendix.
19Cf. Section VI, Appendix.
20Cf. Section III, Appendix.
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property resource (i.e. the target of the pollution).
4. A large country, indulging in Cournot behavior with respect to the
foreign tariffs and pollution abatement expenditures, will use an optimal tariff,
not free trade, to maximize its welfare. The Cournot behavior, however, will
yield a Nash equilibrium which is not Pareto Optimal.21
B. Examining the Objections: Unfair Trade and Feared Loss of High Standards
In light of these propositions, we can now proceed to examine the four
issues distinguished in Section I, especially the first one relating to "unfair
trade" and the associated agitation for countervailing duties against "eco-
dumping" in the absence of CCII harmonization.
1. Does Diversity of Environmental Standards Imply that Low Standard
Countries are Indulging in "Unfair Trade"?
The theoretical analysis clearly shows that the basic presumption is that
different countries will have legitimate diversity of CCII environmental
taxes/standards. This diversity will arise even if they share the same "utility
function" with associated tradeoffs between income and different types of
pollution: the diverse tax rates can come from differences in technology and in
endowments in the broadest sense (so as to include weather, demography,
geography, inherited abatement policies etc.).22
21Cf. Section IV, Appendix.
22We should also state the related but distinct proposition that
diversity of standards across countries will be observed as the norm in
competitive equilibrium and, besides, will change with trade and hence income
(as implicit, of course, in our analysis above and in the Appendix). This
proposition is derived in the context of a model where standards are
characterised as having some of the characteristics of "public goods" in each
of two trading countries and enter directly the utility functions in these
countries, by Alessandra Casella in her paper prepared for this project
(mimeo, June 1994, Columbia University). The focus of our analysis instead is
17
As it happens, there is also no compelling reason to think that every
society must share the same utility function. It is perfectly appropriate, and
not an indulgence of wilful "sovereignty," for Mexico to value clean water higher
than clean air, compared to the US, because a dollar expended on the former
instead of the latter will produce greater health gains for Mexicans whereas it
would be the reverse for the US.
The overall trade-off between income and (some generalized index of)
pollution will also be different between societies: income may be more valuable
at the margin when societies are poor and poverty takes people close to
malnutrition than when societies are rich and malnutrition results from
overindulgence rather than deprivation. A clear example again is the emphasis
on saving dolphins rather than increasing productivity in tuna fishing in the US
and the contrasting emphasis on ameliorating poverty instead in Mexico by using
purse-seine nets that kill dolphins while fishing for tuna.
The notion therefore that the diversity of CCII pollution standards/taxes
is illegitimate and constitutes "unfair trade" or "unfair competition" is itself
illegitimate. So is the consequent demand, following from this notion, that CCII
harmonization is necessary for "free and fair trade"23, in absence of which CCII
differences must be treated as eco-dumping and be countervailed.
In fact, since the effect of such policies would be to force (at least
some) countries to harmonize up their preferred lower CCII standards, the
consequence would equally be to inflict a welfare loss on them. We might even
on the issue of CCII harmonization and on the question of standards-diversity
when welfare-maximization is being pursued (and may require departure from a
laissez-faire competitive equilibrium).
23This phrase has passed even into the latest Annual Report of the
Council of Economic Advisers as part of a definition of "competitiveness"
which Paul Krugman has castigated in a recent article in Foreign Affairs.
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argue then that, while we advocate free trade traditionally, with diversity of
domestic standards, on the presumption that voluntary trade is beneficial
(relative to autarky) for every trading nation, and hence it is a mutual-gain
policy prescription, the opposite is true for CCII harmonization to be
superimposed on free trade24: it will amount to immiseration of the trading
nation whose standards are being "distorted" up.
This basic case against CCII harmonization can be challenged on grounds
which we now examine and mainly find unpersuasive.
Objection (1): Competing with foreign firms that do not bear equal burdens
is unfair: This competitiveness argument is common, especially on the part of
some business groups and also some unions. As notions of unfairness are
expressed by them, and as implied by proposed legislation to equalize burdens,
this is certainly a strongly-felt belief. Underlying it is the sense of outrage
that one's ability to hold on to an industry is compromised by the fact that
one's rivals abroad do not carry the same burdens.
The contrary arguments, which reject this competitiveness argument, are as
follows:
(i) The fact that others abroad do not carry the same burdens is symmetric
with the fact that these countries have different wages, capital costs, skills,
infrastructure, weather, and what have you: all of which lead to differential
advantages of production and trade competitiveness. Diversity of environmental
tax burdens is thus no ground for complaints of unfairness.
(ii) If we lose competitive advantage because we put a larger negative
2AIf the country is large, then we must substitute an optimal tariff for
free trade in this sentence.
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value on a certain kind of pollution whereas others do not is simply the flip
side of the differential valuations. To object to that implication of the
differential valuation is to object to the differential valuation itself, and
hence to our own larger negative valuation. To see this clearly, think only of
a closed economy without trade. If we were to tax pollution by an industry in
such an economy, its implication would be precisely that this industry would
shrink: it loses competitive advantage vis-a-vis other industries in our own
country. To object to that shrinking is to object to the negative valuation
being put on the pollution. There is therefore nothing "unfair" from this
perspective, if our industry shrinks because we put Higher Standards on our
industry and others, who value the pollution less, choose Lower Standards.
(iii) Besides, attributing competitive disadvantage to differential
pollution tax burdens in the fashion of CCII comparisons for individual
industries confuses absolute with comparative advantage. Thus, for example, in
a two-industry world, if both industries abroad have lower pollution tax rates
than at home, both will not contract at home. Rather, the industry with the
comparatively higher tax rate will.
Objection (2): Others' Lower Standards do not reflect correctly their
citizens' Preferences: In turn, some environmentalist critics argue that the
foreign governments do not reflect their citizens' "true preferences" and
therefore in relation to these true preferences which would lead to higher
valuation of pollution, the governments have unduly low standards, implying
"unfair" competition.
There are counter arguments, in turn:
(i) Similar arguments, about failure of "political markets," apply to most
20
countries, including High Standard countries, and to many areas of governmental
regulation. It is commonly argued that the earliest legislations mandated "too
high" environmental standards that went beyond the "optimal" levels because costs
were ignored and virtually limitless gains were assumed from the regulations.
Now, in the US for sure, cost-benefit considerations are steadily being
introduced into the legislative process; and even the judiciary seems to have
turned increasingly to this type of analysis which then tends to weaken the bite
of the standards legislatively laid down.25
Since arguments can be made persuasively that all legislation strays from
the optimal because of political market failures endemic to any political
system, however democratic, objecting only to Lower environmental Standards as
reflecting such political market failure is to be arbitrary. It is also to open
a Pandora's Box, in favour of the more powerful countries which can then throw
stones at others' glass houses while building a fortress around their own.
(ii) Again, even if one argues that the decisions made undemocratically
by a dictatorship or an oligarchy are vitiated, there is no reason to believe
25Thus, recent judicial determinations in the US have undermined the
Public Law that had grown up earlier with strong support for environmentalism
not reflective of costs and benefits, for the possibility of "takings" in the
public environmental interest and in regard to standing and judicial review.
The earlier Public Law literature is well represented by Abram Chayes, "The
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation," 89, Harvard Law Review. 1976, and
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire. 1986; and it is also well developed in India, in
regard to standing (for NGOs etc.) in particular, in the public interest
litigation developed in the Supreme Court. The reverse movement in the US can
be seen from cases such as Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission on takings, Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife on standing, and Competitive
Enterprise Institute v. National High way Traffic Safety Administration and
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA on judicial review. The last area has, in
particular, seen the increased judicial scrutiny of the cost-benefit aspects
of executive actions implementing legislated regulation. The US Congress is
itself currently in the midst of an intense battle over precisely this
question, with the New-Democrat Clinton administration much more open to cost-
benefit analysis than the older Democrats.
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that the Higher Standards being pursued by a foreign country representing the
competitive interests of a foreign industry or labour union in an industry are
what a more democratic process would yield. The correct approach should rather
be to encourage a shift to more democratic procedures in arriving at social and
economic legislation, including environmental policy. Process, not outcomes
(especially outcomes sought by self-serving groups elsewhere), is what we should
aim at in countries that lack democratic ways.26
2. Should High Standards Countries Force Low Standards Countries into Upward
Harmonization to Preserve Their High Standards?
There are two forms of political-economy-theoretic arguments for CCII
harmonization, however, which take the High Standards themselves to be at risk
under Free Trade. Consider each, in turn.
(1) The less common argument is simply that, under pressure of competition
from the Low Standards countries, the political equilibrium will shift in favour
of those who oppose High Standards.
But this argument suffers from the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.
Intensified international competition, no matter why it arises. will put such
pressure on governments to reduce business costs. Why pick on Lower Standards
elsewhere, even assuming that they are contributing to the problem?
(2) Far more worrisome to environmentalists than the simple effects of
trade competition are the fears that "capital and jobs" will move to countries
with Lower Standards, triggering a "race to the bottom" (or, as John Wilson has
remarked, more accurately a race towards the bottom) where countries lower their
26The question of democracy is addressed, from a different perspective,
in Section IV C below.
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standards in an inter-jurisdictional contest, below what some or all would like
in order to attract capital and jobs. So, a cooperative solution that would
coordinate the setting of standards would generally speaking be a better
solution. This coordinated solution, however, need not be characterized by
harmonization at the level of the standards in the High Standards country or, in
fact, by harmonization at all.
What we have here is a valid theoretical argument.27 It is stated with
analytical rigour as follows: independent governments (or jurisdictions),
setting public policy for environmental protection (via taxes and abatement) and
competing for investment by reducing environmental standards in a world of mobile
and scarce capital, will set these standards at levels that are "too low," i.e.
that are inefficient for the world economy (composed of the nations whose
governments compete in this way). The inefficiency is to be construed as usual:
alternative policies exist which make at least one jurisdiction better off and
no other jurisdiction worse off. In short, we have non-Pareto-optimal Cournot-
Nash equilibria (as we have already had in earlier analysis in this paper),
characterised by lower environmental standards than in the cooperative
equilibrium.
To see the matter more clearly, consider the following analysis based on
arbitrarily-specified, conventional pay-off matrices reflecting the incomes
yielded (in brackets) when different pollution abatement expenditures are
undertaken at levels 0 and A (i.e. zero and a finite amount) by the two
countries, Home and Foreign. The abatement expenditures are assumed to be a
27An in-depth review and synthesis of the theoretical literature on this
question is provided by John Wilson in his paper for the Project. We
therefore only sketch here the nature of the argument. Cf. John Wilson,
"Capital Mobility and Environmental Standards: Is There a Theoretical Basis
for a Race to the Bottom?", mimeo, June 1994.
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monotonic and increasing function of environmental standards.
There are thus four possible combinations of home and foreign expenditures
on abatement. The pay-offs associated with each combination (with the first
(resp. second) component being the pay-off of the Home (resp. foreign)
jurisdiction are given by the following pay-off matrix:
Foreign Expenditure
0 A
Home 0 (-2,-2) (2,-3)
Expenditure A (-3, 2) (1,1)
It is easily seen that each jurisdiction has a dominant strategy, viz. to spend
nothing, because by doing so it maximises its pay-off whether the other
jurisdiction spends nothing or A. Yet, compared to this individually-rational
dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium with both jurisdictions spending nothing on
abatement, the collectively rational strategy of each spending A will yield a
higher pay-off for both.
Of course jurisdictional competition need not necessarily lead to such a
"prisoner's dilemma" type of Nash equilibrium. For example, if the pay-off
matrix is as follows,
(-4, -4) (2, -3)
(-3, 2) (1, 1)
(0,A) and (A,0), so that one jurisdiction spends nothing while the other spends
A, are "pure strategy" Nash equilibria.
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In both cases above, the Nash equilibrium is characterised by a "race to
the bottom" in the sense that the pollution abatement expenditure is zero for at
least one jurisdiction. But this need not be so, as consideration of the
following pay-off matrix shows. Thus, consider:
(-2, -2) (2, -3)
(-3, 2) (3, 3)
and it is readily seen that we have a unique Nash equilibrium where each
jurisdiction spends A on abatement.
Of course, these are arbitrarily-constructed pay-off matrices and we need
to ground them in underlying models of economies to see whether such outcomes are
sensible within them. As argued by John Wilson, this can indeed be done to show
that the "race to the bottom" need not occur, and that even a "race to the top"
might.28
The question that now arises is whether this theoretical possibility of the
"race to the bottom" is an empirical possibility of any significance. Leaving
out the question as to whether the parametric evidence shows that the
noncooperative Nash equilibrium, including the special case of the Prisoners'
Dilemma, will be characterized by significantly lower environmental standards
relative to the cooperative equilibrium, we may ask whether there is any
empirical support anyway for the propositions that (1) capital is in fact
responsive to the differences in environmental standards and (2) different
countries/jurisdictions actually play the game then of competitive lowering of
standards to attract capital. Without both these phenomena holding in a




As it happens, systematic evidence is available for the former proposition
alone, but the finding is that the proposition is not supported by the studies
to date: at best, there is very weak evidence in favour of interjurisdictional
mobility in response to CCII differences in environmental standards. Arik
Levinson, who has reviewed the available evidence thoroughly, concludes29:
"The conclusion of the literature on domestic location
decisions, like that on international locations, is that there is
not a lot of evidence that environmental regulations deter
investment. In fact, most authors are careful to note the
limitations of their research, and to place caveats on their
counter-intuitive conclusions that stringent regulations do not
deter plants nor do lax regulations attract them. But the
literature as a whole presents fairly compelling evidence that this
is true."
Of course, there are many ways to interpret this finding of an extremely
weak effect of CCII differences in environmental standards on industry location.
There are three classes of explanation for the finding: (1) that the differences
in standards are not significant and are outweighed by other factors that affect
locational decisions; (2) that exploiting differences in standards is not a good
strategy relative to not exploiting them, and (3) that lower standards may
paradoxically even repel, instead of attracting, direct foreign investment.
Explanation (1):
(i) The obvious, and most cited, explanation is that the standards
differences are a small factor in the location decision because they are
dominated by other more important factors such as tax breaks, infrastructure
29Cf. Arik Levinson's paper for the Project, "Environmental Regulations
and Industry Location: International and Domestic Evidence," 1994. Levinson
looks at both the international and the domestic (e.g. inter-state locational
decisions in the US since states have different standards) evidence, having
himself produced first rate work in the latter genre.
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facilities and proximity to markets.30
(ii) Industry location may be seen to be more sensitive to CCII
differences in standards if executive enforcement and voters-cum-NGO activism are
taken into account as well. The de facto differences in standards may then be
more acute than assumed in many studies.31
Explanation (2):
(iii) Another (static) explanation is that when multi-plant firms, such
as most multinationals, invest in different locations, they tend to work
uniformly with the most stringent standards they face among these locations, to
reduce the transaction costs involved in making diverse choices.32
(iv) Another (dynamic) explanation is that, faced with divergent
standards, firms extrapolate that all countries are on an escalator to similar
higher standards and therefore decide that it is best to be "ahead of the curve"
in the currently-lower-standards countries and to conform to higher standards
even though not required. In this case, again, convergence of standards adhered
to will emerge, as in the preceding (static) argument, and differences in
(required) standards across different jurisdictions will become moot, showing
little relationship in practice between such differences and industry-location
30Cf. Levinson, ibid.. citing, for instance, work by Baumol and Oates,
Low, etc.
31Levinson, ibid.. cites work by Hamilton, Baldwin and Welles, and Walter
on voter participation, in particular.
32Levinson, ibid., cites this explanation from the work of Gladwin and
Welles, and Knogden. The argument requires that the transaction costs of
diverse choices are large enough to offset the foregone advantage of meeting
each standard only as necessary and not beyond. Besides, it does not apply to




(v) Another (dynamic) explanation is that firms may argue that the higher-
standards countries are the ones that innovate, that many innovations lead to
embodied technical change, that such innovations are likely to be embodied (only)
in recent vintages of capital goods that already meet the higher standards, and
therefore the important benefit of significant technical change will accrue to
a firm only insofar as processes and capital goods using higher-standards
technology at present are being used by it.
Explanation (3):
(vi) An ingenious explanation of a different analytical variety is that
multinationals are discouraged from investing in low-standards countries because
local firms have comparative advantage in using pollution-intensive technology
that conforms to lower standards. Hence, Direct Foreign Investment (DFI) is
likely to be less, not more, when CCII differences in standards are greater
between countries!34
A possible underlying explanation is that firms in the higher-standard
countries are likely to scrap their earlier-vintage lower-standard equipment and
sell it to the lower-standard countries for the local firms to use, instead of
undertaking DFI themselves with such discontinued technology. In short, arm's
length sale of lower-standards-conforming equipment to local manufacturers may
be preferred to DFI with such equipment, because the local firms are more likely
to be able to work with this technology than the multinationals that have moved
33Again, the argument requires that the advantages of being "ahead of the
curve" offset the advantages of conforming to lower standards now and adapting
or retooling later when the higher standards emerge.
3ACf. Levinson, ibid., citing Pearson.
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on to higher-standards-conforming newer-vintage technology--engineering and
maintenance know-how tend to get specific to the technology one is working with.
Most of these suggested explanations only reinforce the view that CCII
differences in standards, as a factor prompting a "race to the bottom," should
not be a source of concern.35 And this conclusion is only reinforced when one
contemplates the fact that there is almost no evidence for the proposition that,
regardless of the capital-sensitivity to CCII differences in environmental
standards, different countries and jurisdictions nonetheless actually compete for
capital by sacrificing environmental standards36 (as against doing so via tax
breaks, infrastructure construction, tariff policy, preferential trading
arrangements such as NAFTA where Mexico sought DFI-diversion towards itself
through preferential access to the US market, etc.).
The fuss that is made nonetheless over the "race to the bottom" in the
political arena, as happened in the NAFTA negotiations, can then be explained
either as a reaction to ill-founded fears or as a cynical ploy to advance
environmental or protectionist lobbying interests.
3. Other Arguments and an Alternative Proposal
Therefore, both the concerns with "unfair trade" (Question 1) and "threat
to high standards" (Question 2) , as the reason to push for CCII harmonization as
a precondition for Free Trade or alternatively to invoke eco-dumping duties to
countervail CCII differences in pollution tax burdens, are not compelling. It
35E.g. the (static and dynamic) arguments underlying Explanation (2)
above imply that CCII differences will be disregarded by multinationals in any
event, with their plant-design choice gravitating towards the higher-
standards- conforming technology everywhere and therefore locational choices
becoming independent of CCII differences in standards.
36Cf. Levinson, ibid.
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is best to take, as a general policy, the option of mutual recognition of
standards, recognizing the fact that diversity of CCII standards is basically a
natural and appropriate phenomenon, consistent with Free Trade and the consequent
gains from trade for all.
(i) Protectionist Capture: The wisdom of this policy conclusion is
reinforced by contemplating the certain protectionist consequences of doing
otherwise. Thus, consider what an eco-dumping procedure, supplementing our
normal anti-dumping (AD) procedure, would do. We presume that the eco-dumping
procedure would calculate the subsidy implied by lower standards and proceed to
levy a countervailing duty unless the foreign costs were raised by the estimated
amount, with the option that the duty would be lifted as and when foreign
standards were suitably raised and the costs of foreign firms demonstrably raised
by the calculated amount.
It is well-known that AD actions have become the favored policy instrument
of protectionists today. Their desirability from the viewpoint of protectionists
derives form the fact that, unlike safeguard actions (under Section 201 of US law
and Article XIX of the GATT) , AD actions are selective: they can target down to
the level of the firm, not just a specific foreign country! Compared to pre-set
tariffs, besides, they are also elastic: the duties will be set at rates that
are decided during litigation and therefore are a function of litigation
expenditure, impartiality of the procedures governing the litigation, and the
bilateral game played between the complainants and the targets.
Besides, in playing the game, the rules are set in favour of litigants,
relative to what the rules would be if the objective of AD actions was truly to
avoid economically-defined predation. In particular, the usual game of
reconstructing true costs, against which prices charged are compared to determine
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dumping margins, has been played to the hilt to get these margins to be as high
as possible in litigation. But, as was the case with the former centrally
planned economies whose own prices and costs were dismissed as illegitimate,
these reconstructed "true" costs can be arbitrary, leading the procedure to
effective protectionist capture.
Such capture would surely be the case also with eco-dumping duties since
the eco-dumping margins would have to be necessarily estimated on the basis of
reconstructed costs of meeting the pollution standards of the complainant
country. The EPA of the US, for example, would be estimating the cost of
implementing US standards in Rio or in Jakarta, so as to arrive at the implicit
(not actual and observable) subsidy that must be countervailed through an eco-
dumping duty by the US, just as the Department of Commerce does for conventional
dumping. There is no reason to doubt that the inherently-arbitrary outcomes
would be similarly obliging to local lobbies.37
(ii) Infinite Shadow Prices? Thus, we conclude that the demands for eco-
dumping duties to countervail CCII differences in environmental standards and
pollution tax and abatement burdens are both illogical (in denying the legitimacy
of such diversity) and unwise (in being inherently susceptible to protectionist
capture). We have considered, at different stages of our analysis, several
reasons why nonetheless these demands appear reasonable and why they have
political salience. We must conclude, however, by adding one more reason, which
37To our knowledge, the countervailing of implicit subsidies would be a
novel principle in GATT law on subsidies as well, and is not to be
contemplated with equanimity in view of its explosive potential, which is
probably why the concept of remedy used by the proponents of harmonization of
standards is that of AD rather than of CVD (countervailing duties on foreign
subsidies).
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probably has a counterpart also in the case of labour standards, which springs
from the nature of our basic argument for the legitimacy of diversity in CCII
standards.
Recall our argument that the different shadow prices for pollution that
can, and generally will, emerge among different countries, implying differential
rather than harmonized environmental taxes and standards, are "natural" for us
to contemplate and accept. But suppose that we were putting an infinite price
on any and every specific pollution, regardless of its level, small or large.
Then, these differences would disappear. We believe that many environmentalists
have tended to approach their specific environmental concerns with an implicit
infinite shadow price, thus leading to demands for harmonization, though this is
increasingly less so. This is well-illustrated by the following remarks in
Cropper and Oates' excellent recent review of Environmental Economics:38
The economist's view had--to the dismay of the profession--little
impact on the initial surge of legislation for the control of
pollution. In fact, the cornerstones of federal environmental
policy in the United States, the Amendments to the Clean Air Act in
1970 and to the Clean Water Act in 1972, explicitly prohibited the
weighing of benefits against costs in the setting of environmental
standards. The former directed the Environmental Protection Agency
to set maximum limitations on pollutant concentrations in the
atmosphere "to protect the public health": the latter set as an
objective the "elimination of the discharge of all [our emphasis]
pollutants into the navigable waters by 1985.Ml [Although standards
were to be set solely on the basis of health criteria, the 1970
Amendments to the Clean Air Act did include economic feasibility
among its guidelines for setting source-specific standards. Roger
Noll has suggested that the later 1977 Amendments were, in fact,
more "anti-economic" than any that went before. See Matthew
McCubbins. Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast (1989) for a careful
analysis of this legislation.]
The evolution of environmental policy, both in the U.S. and
elsewhere, has inevitably brought economic issues to the fore :
environmental regulation has necessarily involved costs--and the
38Cf. Maureen Cropper and Wallace Oates, "Environmental Economics: A
Survey," Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. XXX, June 1992, pp. 675-740, pp.
675-676.
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question of how far and how fast to push for pollution control in
light of these costs has entered into the public debate. Under
Executive Order 12291 issued in 1981, many proposed environmental
measures have been subjected to a benefit-cost test. In addition,
some more recent pieces of environmental legislation, notably the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) and the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FI-FRA), call for weighing benefits
against costs in the setting of standards.
Once therefore we get away from the limited, perhaps almost-empty, set of
infinite-shadow-price environmental objectives, we are then back also to the
legitimacy of diversity of standards among trading nations as the natural and
reasonable way to look at the issue.39
(iii) An Alternative Proposal: We should thus reject the calls for "CCII
harmonization or countervailing duties on eco-dumping." But the political
salience of such calls remains a major problem. One may well ask then: are there
any "second-best' approaches, short of the eco-dumping and CCII harmonization
proposals, that may address some of the political concerns at least economic
cost? In that spirit, we would suggest the following proposal for consideration.
Proposal: Extend Domestic Standards in High Standards Countries to their Firms
in Low Standards Countries. Unilaterally or Through OECD Code: In our view, the
political salience of the harmful demands for eco-dumping duties and CCII
harmonization is greatest when plants are closed by one's own multinationals and
shifted to other countries. The actual shifting of location, and the associated
loss of jobs in that plant, magnify greatly the fear of the "race to the bottom"
and of the "impossibility" of competing against low standards countries.
Similarly, when investment by one's own firms is seen to go to specific countries
39Questions raised by "values"-related differences in CCII standards are
considered separately below.
33
which happen to have lower standards, the resentment gets to be focussed readily
against those countries and their standards. However, when jobs are lost simply
because of trade competition, it is much harder to locate one's resentment and
fear on one specific foreign country and its policies as a source of unfair
competition.40 Hence, a second-best proposal could well be to address this
particular fear, however unfounded and often illogical, of outmigration of plants
and investment by one's firms abroad in low standards countries.
The proposal is to adapt the Sullivan Principles approach to the problem
at hand. Under Sullivan, US firms in South Africa were urged to adopt US
practices, not the South African apartheid ways, in their operations. If this
principle that US firms in Mexico be subject to US environmental policies
(choosing the desired ones from the many that obtain across different states in
this federal country) were adopted by US legislation, that would automatically
remove whatever incentive there was to move because of environmental burden
differences.41
This proposal that one's firms abroad behave as if they were at home--do
in Rome as you do in New York, not as Romans do--can be either legislated
unilaterally by one High Standard country or by a multilateral binding Treaty
among different High Standard countries. Again, it may be reduced to an
exhortation, just as Sullivan Principles were, by single countries in isolation
or by several as through a nonbinding but ethos-defining and policy-encouraging
OECD Code.
A0This, of course, does not apply equally to trade in highly
differentiated products like autos where one can get fixated on specific
countries, e.g. Japan.
41See Bhagwati, "American Rules, Mexican Jobs," The New York Times. March
24, 1993.
34
The disadvantage of this proposal, of course, is that it does violate the
diversity-is-legitimate rule whose desirability was discussed above. Investment
flows, like investment of one's own funds and production and trade therefrom,
should reflect this diversity. It reduces, therefore, the efficiency gains from
a freer flow of cross-country investments today. But if environmental tax burden
differences are not all that different, or do not figure prominently in firms'
locational decisions, as the empirical literature seems to stress,42 the
efficiency costs of this proposal could also be minimal while the gains in
allaying fears and therefore moderating the demand for bad proposals could be
very large indeed.
Yet another objection may focus on intra-OECD differences in High
Standards. Since there are differences among the OECD countries in CCII
environmental tax burdens in specific industries for specific pollutions, this
Proposal would lead to "horizontal inequity" among the OECD firms in third
countries. If the British burden is higher than the French, British firms would
face a bigger burden in Mexico than the French firms. But then such differences
already exist among firms abroad since tax practices among the OECD countries on
taxation of firms abroad are not harmonized in many respects/3 Interestingly,
A2Recall our analysis, based on Arik Levinson's review, ibid.
43One of the important reasons for such nonharmonization (documented by
Joel Slemrod in his paper for the Project) is that horizontal equity among
firms from different countries abroad can conflict with the desire to have
horizontal equity among one's firms at home and one's firms abroad. This
problem comes up quite directly in regard to personal income taxation where
the US practice is to tax on basis of citizenship while the practice elsewhere
is to tax on basis of residence. The former ensures horizontal equity between
US citizens at home and abroad but, given the residence-based taxation
practice of other nations, leads to lack of horizontal equity between, say, US
and French citizens in Manila or New Delhi where US citizens must continue to
pay US income taxes (subject to some exemptions) while the French citizens do
not have to pay French income taxes. The questions raised by the US practice
of exercising income tax jurisdiction on its citizens abroad, through the
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the problem of horizontal equity has come up in relation also to the demands of
the poor countries (that often find it difficult to enforce import restrictions
effectively) that the domestic restrictions on hazardous products be
automatically extended to exports by every country. That would put firms in the
countries with greater restrictions at an economic disadvantage. But agreement
has now been reached to disregard the problem.
Other problems may arise: (i) monitoring of one's firms in a foreign
country may be difficult; and (ii) the countries with Lower Standards may object
on grounds of "national sovereignty." Neither argument may be compelling. It
is unlikely that a developing country would object to foreign firms doing better
by its citizens in regard to environmental standards (that it itself cannot
afford to impose, given its own priorities, on its own firms). Equally, it would
then assist in monitoring the foreign firms.
III. The Question of Ethical Preferences
So far, we have considered only those demands for harmonization of cross-
national intra-industry standards that arise because of considerations centered
on "unfair trade" and the fear that one's standards would be endangered if
competitiveness is reduced because of lower standards abroad.
However, we must recognize that, for some environmentalists, the desire to
spread one's ethical values to others also leads to demands for harmonization,
especially of production processes. Thus, opponents in the US of purse-seine
citizenship rather than residence nexus, have been extensively studied by
modern economists cognizant of the extensive international personal mobility
today. Cf. Jagdish Bhagwati and John Wilson (eds.), Income Taxation and
International Personal Mobility. MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1991.
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fishing of tuna, which kills dolphins alongside and cruelly, would like to see
the suspension of trade in Mexican tuna so as to get the Mexicans to accept the
US restrictions on such fishing. Of course, some of the agitation proceeds from
environmentalists who would find it morally reprehensible to trade in products
whose harvesting has cruelly abused nature or a preferred species. But a main
impulse is simply the old, morality-driven desire to spread the values to which
one subscribes, trade suspension of access to one's market being justified by a
consequentialist ethic rather than a categorical imperative. Consider these two
arguments in reverse order.
A. Spreading Ethical Preferences to Others
We think that GATT-sanctioning of the use of unilateral state action to
suspend other countries' trade access, or (in GATT-defined parlance) their
trading rights under the GATT "treaty", unless one's choice of ethical concerns
is adopted by others through implicit harmonization in one's direction, is
inappropriate for several reasons.44
(1) The values so sought to be imposed are often not at the level of
"human rights" such as the massacres perpetuated on one's population or
apartheid. They are "lesser" values and idiosyncratic in the sense of being
closely culture-bound rather than reflective of basic and universal aspects of
human nature. Thus, Americans are particularly touched by dolphins being caught
cruelly in purse-seine nets in fishing tuna. But we wonder when we see on
television an interview with the man who brought this to national attention by
44Insofar as it involves suspension of trade access by a country for
products that are produced by processes that are disapproved of, it is also
GATT-illegal as per the first Tuna-Dolphin Panel finding, and as discussed in
Section IV.
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filming the dolphins in distress: he is, we think, eating fish in the wilds. If
Americans have their dolphins, the Indians have their sacred cows. Animal rights
activists object to our slaughter houses. Others may see in Robert Redford's
magical moments when he fishes in A River Runs Through It. not his rapport with
nature, but his violation of it with cruelty to the fish that twists and turns,
writhing in agony.
The culture-specificity of these values, and hence their lack of salience
to other economically weaker nations on whom they are sought to be imposed,
creates then the inevitable sense that the use of trade sanctions to impose them
is simply an act of unjustified moral militancy that is itself ethically
offensive. This view gains further credibility when the "values" being pushed
on others are actually at the expense of more fundamental values: e.g. Americans
would prefer to protect dolphins at the expense of Mexican prosperity (through
the use of more productive purse-seine nets) that would reduce Mexican poverty,
putting dolphins ahead of Mexicans. The Mexican reaction may then well be
similar to that of American liberals if they had to confront the moral militancy
of Pat Robertson allied with Genghis Khan.
(2) And then there is the objection that comes from the lack of symmetry
in imposing one's idiosyncratic moral preferences on others, as between the
strong and the weak nations. Thus, even some NGOs in poor countries, whose
natural tendency would be to ally with NGOs in rich countries, have expressed
resentment and opposition to the "eco-imperialism" implied when the strong
nations use trade power to force their preferred values on the weaker nations but
the equally autonomous values of the weaker nations cannot be forced upon the
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stronger nations thus.45 These NGOs deny that the NGOs of the strong nations
have monopoly on virtue.
Thus, we may quote the most radical of today's pro-environment NGOs in
India on this issue, in an editorial on "Trade Control is not a fair instrument"
in the country's leading environmental magazine, Down to Earth:46
... in the current world reality trade is used as an instrument
entirely by northern countries to discipline environmentally errant
nations. Surely, if India or Kenya were to threaten to stop trade
with USA, it would hardly affect the latter. But the fact of the
matter is that it is the northern countries that have the greatest
impact on the world's environment and yet, their past record in
their own countries... is nothing to be proud of...the instruments
that need to be devised for...a system of global discipline must be
fair and equally accessible to all. Reinforcing [through unilateral
muscle-flexing by rich-country NGOs and their governments via trade
sanctions] the power that already flows in a northern direction
cannot improve the world.
(3) The GATT Report on Trade and the Environment last year drew attention,
not to this disturbing asymmetry of effective enforceability of the "values" of
the North versus the equally autonomous "values" of the South owing to
differential power. Rather, eschewing the problem of asymmetric power and
instead assuming that each nation can play the same game with equal
effectiveness, it advanced the "slippery slope" scenario: that, if any country
could suspend another's trading access in products produced in an "unacceptable"
fashion (when no international physical spillovers could be cited as a possible
justification and only "values" were at stake), the result was likely to be a
proliferation of trade restrictions without any discipline or restraint:47
45This "break in the ranks" occurs when there are diverse priorities at
stake. Among single-issue NGOs, as on child labour, we can expect more
international solidarity, of course.
46August 15, 1992, p. 4. The magazine is published in New Delhi and
enjoys a large circulation.
47Cf. GATT, Annual Report. 1991, Geneva: Switzerland, pp. 33-34.
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... it is difficult to think of a way to effectively contain the
cross-border assertion of priorities. If governments suspend the
trading rights of other nations because they unilaterally assert
that their environmental priorities [i.e. "values"] are superior to
those of others, then the same approach can be employed on any
number of grounds. Protectionists would welcome such unilateralism.
They could exploit it to create embargoes, special import duties and
quotas against rivals by enacting national legislation that
unilaterally defines environmental agendas that other countries
[with different "values"] are likely to find unacceptable.
Changing the world trading rules so as to permit the suspension
of trading rights of others by individual contracting parties, based
simply on the unilateral and extra-territorial assertion of their
environmental priorities, undoubtedly would be difficult because
many countries would consider such a change to be a big step down a
slippery slope.
(4) These views concerning unilateralism to impose one's values on others
acquire yet greater cogency when we recognize that there are alternative ways in
which one's values can be indulged and propagated.
(i) Most important, if your values are good, as with now-widely-shared
human rights, they will spread because of their intrinsic appeal. Mahatma
Gandhi's idea of nonviolence spread far and wide, not because India had economic
power to force it on others or because Western NGOs urged trade sanctions against
their own nations to canvass its adoption. It spread because of its inherent and
powerful moral attractiveness. The Spanish Inquisition should not be necessary
to spread Christianity; quite appropriately, the Pope has no troops.
Thus, consider the following argument, advanced by one of the ablest
advocates of environmentalist causes, Steve Charnovitz, in defense of
biodiversity:
There are important medical reasons to preserve biodiversity. But
there are also important moral reasons. Geopolitical boundaries
should not override the word of God who directed Noah to take two of
every living creature into the Ark "to keep them alive with you.ltA8
A8Cf. Steve Charnovitz, "GATT and the Environment: Examining the Issues,"
International Environment Affairs. vol. 4(3), Summer 1992, p. 211. This is an
interesting, thought-provoking and lucidly-argued but ultimately unpersuasive
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We must confess that, as two Hindus among nearly 900 million on this planet, we
find this moral argument culture-specific rather than universal in its appeal.
It is unlikely that it can spread because of its intrinsic moral merit; should
it then be forced on others anyway?
(ii) Moreover, alternative private options are often available to
propagate your particular ethical preferences if greater activism is desired.
Nothing today proscribes NGOs in United States, for example, from financing NGOs
in Mexico into bringing pressure on their government to change its attitude on
purse-seine nets, thus changing the balance of forces in Mexico away from more
productive tuna fishing that benefits Mexico economically and towards "dolphin-
safe" fishing that benefits the dolphins in the Eastern Pacific instead.
(iii) Then again, voluntary private boycotts can be a potent instrument
as well. A long-standing tradition permits such private boycotts in pluralistic
democracies. Provided labeling requirements that permit consumers to make the
choices in the marketplace between, say, "dolphin-safe" and "dolphin-unsafe" tuna
are allowed, these boycotts will provide an option to "dolphin-agitated"
activists.49
This option is not the same as proscription, of course. Environmentalists
will thus note that labeling may be ineffective because "consumers may act
rationally in calculating that their individual purchase of environmentally
unfriendly products...would have only a negligible effect" and that "consumers
may act irrationally" by not appreciating the ecological importance of avoiding
the consumption of the offending product.50
critique of the GATT Report, ibid, and on the Dolphin-Tuna Panel Report.
*
9Cf. GATT Report, ibid, pp. 33-34.
50Cf. Charnovitz, ibid.. p. 213.
41
Then again, there are bound to be substantive disagreements about the
nature and extent of labeling: "dolphin-unsafe" labeling may be objected to as
too pejorative and "Tuna from Mexico" may be considered too weak. The problems
that have plagued the labeling issue for a variety of reasons within the United
States itself, both in terms of its design and its uniformity versus diversity
among the different States of the Union, will not go away at the international
level: if anything, they will be more fiercely debated.51
But, against these factors that weaken the efficacy of the voluntary-
boycott prescription, we must put contrary arguments. Indeed, one might argue
that, if enough people desire to attach opprobrium to "dolphin-safe" tuna
producers to put their own "dolphin-safe" labels, requiring only state monitoring
and prosecution of false labelling by the dolphin-unsafe tuna producers. After
all, Body Shop has done pretty well in this way.
Moreover, boycotts in rich countries with big markets, even when leaky, can
carry disproportionate clout, and the funds at the disposal of some of the
environmental NGOs and certainly in their aggregate (as demonstrated when they
carry enormously expensive full-page ads simultaneously in newspapers such as The
New York Times. The Washington Post and The Financial Times') are evidently large
relative to what the poor countries they occasionally target can muster in
defense of their own practices and preferences.52
51The recently activated GATT Group on Environment Measures and
International Trade has among its tasks the examination of the trade effects
of packaging and labeling requirements intended to protect the environment.
It has been examining the packaging and labeling questions in depth.
52It is not just that the budgets of the poor countries are financially
strapped. It is also that few Parliaments would sanction expenditure of the
huge amounts of money that are needed to take out ads in the Western papers
and to hire lobbyists in Washington. The only democratic exception seems to
be Mexico which had, at the end of 1991, as many as 71 lobbying firms in US
registered as "foreign agents" acting on behalf of NAFTA.
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One might also add that the passionate zeal with which these boycotts are
advocated, and the occasional willingness to portray those that disagree as
morally defective, add to their potency as weapons.
A critic may well suggest that we contradict ourselves if we allow private
boycotts but would disallow governmental prohibitions, since governments are only
"agents" of the citizens. Strictly speaking, this is not true: there is
considerable debate in the social science literature on the "principal-agent"
relationship and on how poor an agent the government can be. But, that
complexity aside, we do distinguish all the time in democracies between state and
private actions, permitting far greater latitude to the latter. Thus, when the
Harvard lawyer Alan Dershowitz agitated successfully to have the Boston Symphony
Orchestra cancel Vanessa Redgrave's appearance because of her politically
incorrect views, he was considered well within his rights to disgrace himself;
but the United States government proscribing her appearance would have been a
disgrace to the nation and in violation of our tradition and would surely have
been struck down by our courts. And this asymmetry between what private parties
and public governments may do is likely to be accepted by most democratic
governments today.
(5) So far, we have proceeded on the assumption that unilateral suspension
of trade access to spread one's ethical preferences is effective and have argued
essentially that it is unwise and undesirable. But a legitimate critique may
well be that such action is likely to be ineffective in its objective, thus
disrupting trade to no advantage.
It is hard to settle this question on theoretical grounds alone. The cost
imposed on the nation whose offending trade is suspended may or may not be
significant enough to matter in its calculation; the cost itself will reflect the
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importance of the embargoed market relative to others, ability to evade etc. But
it is surely improbable that this cost in any specific instance will be
compelling.53
The matter becomes less problematic if the cost is greatly increased by
other punishments and inducements: Mexican compliance with nonuse of purse-seine
nets, despite the favorable Tuna-Dolphin Panel ruling, was secured by convincing
President Salinas that it would be hard to pass NAFTA in Congress otherwise.
These added instruments, however, will be available only to large and powerful
nations, chiefly the United States, making the argument's relevance fairly
negligible for most nations.
The sanctioning, as WTO-cons is tent, of unilateral, governmental withdrawal
of market access from other nations for their offending products simply with a
view to coercing them into accepting one's idiosyncratic "value" preferences
seems therefore to be undesirable on several grounds, chiefly:
* it is essentially intransitive, with each nation able to say its specific
values are better than another's; it thus creates the potential for chaotic
spread of trade restrictions based on self-righteousness, compounded by a likely
encouragement of the process by protectionists;
* in its reliance on force rather than persuasion, it is inherently
asymmetric towards poor nations with less economic clout, implying that the
economically strong nations are also morally superior and their governments must
not be constrained by multilateral rules from coercing others into conversion;
and
* there are alternative private options that can be used to create a
53We are talking here of unilateral actions. Where a substantial
plurilateral or multilateral consensus is achieved on a suspension of trade
access, the cost imposed will generally be higher.
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multilateral consensus of shared values based not on the sword but on precept,
example and even pressure via boycotts.5*
Even though some of the environmental NGOs in the United States, in
particular, and perhaps elsewhere too, are skeptical or scornful of them, it is
noteworthy that these arguments are spreading within the international community.
Thus, Steve Charnovitz has recently complained:55
The GATT's campaign against unilateralism is having some impact.
Earlier this year, the UN Conference on Trade and Development
adopted a resolution stating that 'Unilateral actions to deal with
environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing
country should be avoided.' The Rio Declaration repeats this
statement.
We have little doubt, however, that unilateral actions designed simply to spread
"lesser values" to others through the use of suspension of trading access are
unwise. We are therefore only delighted that this view is gaining ground.
B. Rejecting Trade in "Defiled" Products
Suppose, however, that your intention in unilaterally denying Mexico access
to the US market is not to change Mexican fishing of tuna in a "Dolphin-safe"
direction, but simply to avoid eating a "defiled" product that offends your moral
values.56 Should you then be forced into consuming Mexican tuna? That would
5
*Jessica Matthews has argued that sometimes unilateralism has enabled
the U.S. to provide leadership on important issues. But, even if this were
true, it would not justify unilateralism. After all, just because
dictatorships may sometimes be beneficial, we would not permit them and
renounce our loyalty to democracy.
55Charnovitz, ibid, pp. 206-207.
56So, you are not a "consequentialist" but one who has an "absolute"
moral value. You may not expect to change Mexican behavior; you may even be
hurting only yourself. But you may be doing what you think duty or virtue
compels. It is worth noting, however, that one does not have to deny Mexico
access to the US market to avoid eating a "defiled product." After all, by
not eating any tuna whatsoever and by directing political action at boycotts
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seem a tall order to many.
But there is an answer to this objection. Nothing in current or
prospective GATT rules forces you (quite correctly) into this offensive option.
For, you could certainly compensate the country whose trading rights (i.e. access
to your market) are being denied or suspended by either offering other
concessions or. (in the odd manner of GATT procedures) having the other country
withdraw some "equivalent" concessions of her own to you p_r, (in a manner
advocated by some), through cash compensation for the gains from trade lost by
the other country.
Confronted by this argument, some environmentalists are offended: why
should we have to pay for our principles? The answer is: that is a small price
to pay if the alternative (of unilateralism) has the many drawbacks which were
noted by us already. If it is right in the Christian tradition to buy
indulgences to pay for one's vice, perhaps one should not object to a proposal
to pay for one's virtue: at least, the former is for personal gain, the latter
(if you accept our arguments) for social gain.57 Besides, the "payment" is not
in cash but in compensation in the form of reductions of other trade barriers
against the foreign country to offset the enactment of the trade barrier against
its offending export (or a retaliatory raising of trade barriers by the foreign
country). Such payment, in fact, should work in the direction of moving
resources away from the offending foreign activity, thus reinforcing the case for
or education instead of seeking official embargoes, one can adversely hurt the
market for Mexican tuna as well. As noted earlier, the market pressure
induced by such an action could also lead Mexican fishermen to abandon
dolphin-unsafe fishing methods in order to regain lost markets.
57There is, of course, a "moral hazard" problem: countries may become
deliberately sinful to be bribed into virtue. But we doubt this is likely to
be a serious problem since the compensation in practice is likely to continue
to be in form of other trade concessions in lieu of the one withdrawn.
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using such a policy option.
Charnovitz also appeals to "original intent" to argue that the original
signatories to the GATT, and earlier practice in some cases, permitted exceptions
to market access based on extra-jurisdictional exercise of "values" in cases such
as the prohibited US landing and sale of US sponges from the Gulf of Mexico
gathered by "certain harmful methods [such as] diving or using a diving
apparatus."58 We are assured by academic legal experts on the GATT however that
the GATT's "original intent" is not unambiguously inferred in this as in many
other instances.
John Jackson, one of the leading authorities on GATT law, has thus argued
that:59
It has been argued [by Charnovitz] that the drafting history of the
GATT would lead to an interpretation of Article XX that would permit
governments to take a variety of environmental measures and justify
them under the general exceptions of GATT. While this view is
interesting, and the research is apparently thorough, it is not
entirely persuasive and overlooks important issues of treaty
interpretation. Under typical international law, elaborated by the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, preparatory work history
is an ancillary means of interpreting treaties. In the context of
interpreting the GATT, we have more than forty years of practice
since the origin of GATT, and we also have some very important
policy questions...Thus, unlike certain schools of thought
concerning United States Supreme Court interpretation of the United
States Constitution, it is this author's view that one cannot rely
too heavily on the original drafting history.
In any event, the liberal environmentalists who would ordinarily oppose the
appointments of "original intent" judges on the Supreme Court should not endorse
this juridical approach in seeking to prevent the GATT from pursuing (what we
have argued are) sensible interpretations of its laws on environmental issues.
58Ibid.. pp. 204-205.
59Cf. John Jackson, "World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies:
Convergence or Conflict?11, Washington and Lee Law Review, vol. 49(4), Fall
1992, pp. 1241-1242.
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C. Dealing with Ethical Preferences
Where does this analysis leave us? Based on it, as also on arguments
produced immediately below concerning the way GATT deals with objections by
Contracting Parties to processes of production (as distinct from products
themselves) used by other Contracting Parties, we think that the following
recommendations have merit in case of ethics-based objections to providing market
access:
Unilateralism
* Unilateral suspension of trading access for ethical-preference-based
reasons should not be sanctioned by the WTO; and
* such unilateral suspensions, where desired, should be "paid for" by
other, equivalent trade concessions.
Plurilateralism/Multilateralism
Where the ethical preference is embodied in a plurilateral (i.e. multi-
nation) treaty signed by many nations, we need to distinguish between two major
cases:
1. Plurilateral treaties concerning an ethical preference, as on
preventing the production of chickens in batteries or injecting cattle with
hormones for instance, may be signed by enough nations to enable a WTO waiver;
in this case, the compatibility of the plurilateral treaty and the WTO is
assured.
2. Where this is not so, and the number of nations signing the ethical-
preference -embodying treaty falls short of the required WTO waiver majority, then
the conflict can lead to problems. In particular:
* Products: Where the plurilateral treaty simply provides for suspension
of trade access for the offending products--such as ivory or tigers or whales--
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there Is no difficulty in enforcing such a ban as long, of course, as the ban
extends in a nondiscriminatory fashion to both foreign and domestic supply.60
Where, however, the signatory nations seek to impose trade sanctions (i.e.
trade disruption of products other than the one in dispute) , as a punishment
aimed at securing compliance, the consensus appears to be that such sanctions
would be GATT-inconsistent.61 In that case, our solution would be to treat
these sanctions as indeed so and instead to encourage nations to use other
instrumentalities (of the kind discussed above, e.g. suasion, NGO activities) to
secure the necessary acceptance of the ideas by a plurality of WTO Contracting
Parties sufficient to obtain a waiver. This is indeed the procedure that has
been used to undertake trade embargoes in matters such as apartheid where South
Africa, despite being a GATT member, was embargoed under multilateralism-based
UN procedures that would have procured equally a GATT waiver.
* Processes: The GATT would appear to proscribe the suspension of market
access to other Contracting Parties in products whose manufacture or production
is objected to by the importing Contracting Party. In our view, as developed in
the next Section, this is a desirable proscription. If, therefore, it is desired
that such suspension of market access be undertaken in any event--as was the case
with the proscription of hormone-fed beef by the EC--then we would recommend that
the suspension be "paid for" by compensatory trade concessions elsewhere, exactly
60This is argued in the next Section. It may however be useful to
clarify the matter so as to eliminate any ambiguities and doubts in the
matter.
61Section 301 actions aimed at securing new trade concessions, rather
than at securing compliance with treaty-defined trade objections, fall into
this class of problems, of course. On their GATT-inconsistency, see Jagdish
Bhagwati and Hugh Patrick (eds.), Aggressive Unilateralism. Michigan
University Press: Ann Arbor, 1991, and especially the contributions by Hudec
and Bhagwati in the volume.
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as in the case of unilateral trade access suspensions discussed above.
IV. Institutional Vulnerability of High Standards to Objections bv
Low Standards Countries: GATT's Threat to Environmental Autonomy
We turn finally to the question of the threats seen by many
environmentalists to their High Standards (aimed at domestic regulation) by GATT
procedures that enable Low Standards countries to question, and (if successful)
to undermine, these High Standards. We must ask: are the environmentalists
legitimately worried about the roadblocks that current and prospective GATT rules
can pose for environmental regulations and standards aimed entirely at domestic
production and consumption, matters which are conventionally and properly within
domestic jurisdiction?
Now, as long as these rules are applied without discrimination between
domestic and foreign suppliers and among different foreign suppliers, there is
really little that GATT rules can do to prevent a country from doing anything
that it wants to do. For domestic conservation, safety and health reasons, a
contracting party of the GATT can even undertake discriminatory, selectively-
targeted trade-restraining action, subject to safeguards, under Articles XX(b)
and XX(g).62
Thus, if you insist on safety-belts or air bags in cars, you can impose
them on cars as long as both imports from all sources and domestic production are
62These questions are addressed with far greater authority by Frieder
Rosseler, Legal Counsellor to the GATT, in his contribution to this Project,
op.cit. Also see the papers by Robert Hudec and Henry Farber, and by Amy
Porges, the former on the broader legal issues and the latter on European
Community law.
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symmetrically treated. So also for requiring catalytic converters to reduce
environmentally harmful emissions.
A. The Problem of Processes
The most significant and contentious conceptual question arises when you
have a rule that says that consumption (from both domestic and foreign sources)
of a product will be restricted if the product is produced, using a process you
disapprove of. Objecting to a process used in a foreign (or, strictly,
nondomestic) jurisdiction is, under GATT rulings, not acceptable. There are two
types of such process-related problems that we might distinguish:
(i) where the process used is objected to because of "values": e.g. purse
seine nets or leghold traps; and
(ii) where the process used is objected to because it creates cross-border
physical spillovers and hence a global pollution problem: e.g. acid rain or
global warming.63
GATT law, as currently interpreted, forbids the use of trade restrictions
for both classes of objections. For the first class of actions, this
proscription seems to us justified, in light of our discussion in Section III.
The presence of cross-border physical spillovers, whose analysis we sketch
only briefly in Section V, raises more legitimate worries about altogether ruling
out process-related trade restraints, and appropriate changes in GATT law will
be necessary in this class of cases where it seems evidently inappropriate to
63Nearly all cases can be fitted into one or both of these categories.
Thus, if chickens are produced in batteries, this may be objected to as cruel,
fitting it into category (i). If you overfish in the Commons to which I have
access, that fits into category (ii). If you use your forests in an
"unsustainable" way, I may object to it because I think that is bad per se,
i.e. category (i), or because it affects global warming and hence me, i.e.
category (ii), or because of both reasons.
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prevent nations from any use of trade restraints to limit the physical harm being
imposed on them by other nations whose trade accentuates this harm. Such use
must, however, be regulated in a way that ensures symmetry of rights, equity and
efficiency. Devising appropriate procedures and rules to regulate the use of
such trade restraints in the context of global environmental problems is a
challenge for the architects of the new GATT system.
B. Products
It would appear however that the GATT rules should cause no problems for
the environmentalists (except for the process-related issues) when only purely
domestic environmental problems are at issue. Thus, the GATT Report argues
that:6*
Under GATT's rules, governments can employ many different measures
to protect and improve the local environment. Thus, sales taxes on
products that can create pollution (those containing
chloroflurocarbons, for example), deposit refund schemes for
recyclable waste (bottles, scrap cars), or favourable tax treatment
of environmentally friendly products (lead-free gasoline, solar
panels for home heating) and other non-discriminatory measures
ensuring a pattern of domestic consumption that minimizes pollution
would not normally be open to challenge.
There is also nothing in the GATT that prevents contracting
parties from taxing or regulating domestic producers who engage in
polluting activities--even to the extent of prohibiting the
production and sale of particular goods. For instance, ceilings on
air pollution levels, and levies on companies that discharge
pollutants into lakes and rivers, are fully consistent with GATT
rules.
In certain cases, even a measure taken for environmental
protection purposes which would otherwise violate GATT obligations
not to discriminate may be permitted under Article XX of the GATT.
The narrowly-defined exceptions in Article XX permit a contracting
party to place health, safety or domestic resource conservation
goals ahead of non-discrimination, but only when certain conditions
are fulfilled. In general, these conditions ensure that a trade
measure is necessary for the achievement of such goals--and that
these goals are not used as a pretext for reducing competition from
6AGATT Report, ibid.. pp. 22-23.
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imports.
GATT rules, therefore, place essentially no constraints on a
country's right to protect its own environment against damage from
either domestic production or the consumption of domestically
produced or imported products. Generally speaking, a country can do
anything to imports or exports that it does to its own products, and
it can do anything it considers necessary to its own production
processes.
Alas, that is not the end of the matter for the environmentalists. For, as the
GATT Report suggests, even if a regulation or a standard were set in an
apparently nondiscriminatory fashion, it is perfectly possible that:
* in reality, its intention is to discriminate against imports rather than
to reach the stated (environmental or other) objective; and
* in practice, even if the intention is truly to reach the stated goal, the
choice from different ways to reach that goal may have been in favour of a
regulation or standard that effectively discriminates most, rather than least,
against imports.
Then again, especially when safety and health standards are set (as with
phytosanitary standards), there have been increasing demands for "scientific
tests" as a precondition for the imposition of such standards, so as again to
make these palatable to other trading nations who might see their resulting loss
of markets as otherwise unreasonable.
These are perhaps the most contentious issues today where the trading
interests see the reasonableness of current and prospective GATT procedures
designed to ensure as much freedom of access to markets as possible whereas the
environmental interests see in the same procedures an unreasonable bias against
themselves. In all these areas, the GATT permits challenges to be mounted by
contracting parties to be mediated by dispute settlement Panels and for codes and
rules that define how the Panels might adjudicate these disputes. We will say
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a little about each of these issues.65
1. The Intention Issue:
Economists have long recognized the intention issue. Thus, the classic
instance we regale our students with relates to Gottfried Haberler's example of
the provision in the German tariff, dating from 1902 and valid decades later,
which was clearly meant to apply to Switzerland and Austria, relating to "brown
or dappled cows reared at a level of at least 300 meters above the sea and
passing at least one month in every summer at a height of at least 800
metres."66
Within the environmental field, a fine example where the United States was
the aggrieved party is provided by the Canadian province Ontario's 10% tax on
beer cans but not bottles, on environmental grounds. Even if the United States
authorities did not challenge the objective of restricting the use of cans,67
65The GATT law on this general question, and its relatively more
environmentally-friendly nature relative to the inter-state "Dormant Clause"
doctrine in the United States, are the subject of the penetrating analysis by
Daniel Farber and Robert Hudec in their paper (mimeo. 12 September 1994,
University of Minnesota) for this project. They distinguish between the
"facially-discriminatory" and the "facially-neutral" (but nonetheless
discriminatory, whether "indirectly" and "incidentally" or otherwise)
regulations, analyzing how GATT and US jurisprudence apply to each of these in
regard to their implications for trade that lead to litigation.
That the GATT law is essentially more environmentally-friendly was borne
out also by the GATT panel finding in the EU versus the United States case on
US fuel conservation measures in September 1994, which upheld much of the U.S.
law as consistent with the GATT, even when the conflict seemed compelling
prima facie.
66Gottfried Haberler, Theory of International Trade. William Hodge & Co.,
Ltd.: London, p. 339. Haberler cited this amusing case as an instance of the
manner in which countries evaded the obligation of the Most Favoured Nation
clause.
67As argued below, a challenge to recycling and packaging requirements
cannot be ruled out on the ground that alternative, less-trade-restricting
measures are possible and should be undertaken.
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they could legitimately note that the law was likely to have been motivated by
the desire to discriminate against foreign beer supplies who (unlike local
rivals) predominantly used cans rather than bottles, combined tellingly with the
fact that the use of cans for other products such as soups and juices (where
Ontario producers would have been affected) was not proscribed.68
It is hard to see how a good, open trading system cannot permit member
countries to examine the bona fides of environmental (and other) regulations in
this way. Surely, given the ease with which regulations and standards can be
misused for protectionist purposes, some mechanism must exist for grievances to
be aired and adjudicated. The GATT dispute settlement mechanism, albeit improved
as contemplated in the Uruguay Round and further in the direction of greater
transparency, is sufficiently objective and neutral between contracting parties
to provide a better method for dealing with the problem than national procedures
which would always be suspect as having been influenced by national political
considerations.
2. The Alternative-Measures Issue
There are more difficult issues, however, when the question of the use of
alternative ways of reaching an environmental objective is raised.
It seems totally sensible that, if alternative ways of meeting an
environmental objective exist, a contracting party should be asked to choose one
that infringes least on another's trading rights. In fact, this view seems
embodied in GATT's Article XX(b) which allows even discriminatory trade
68From the economic perspective, a domestic firm acting strategically may
also be able to persuade its government to enact higher standards whose effect
is to make the cost of entry by foreign rivals, which must tool up to meet
these higher standards, disproportionately higher (since the domestic firm has
a significantly higher proportion of its sales in its own market). Higher
standards in this case would then be in reality a protectionist technique for
making market access by foreign firms more expensive.
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restrictions against another contracting party if the measures are deemed
"necessary" to protect human, animal or plant life or health.
Two different views of the matter, however, can be taken in interpreting
what is "necessary." Thus, in the case of Thailand's restrictions on importation
and internal taxes on cigarettes, the GATT Panel decided that Thailand should use
the "least GATT-inconsistent" measure to achieve its domestic objective. Then
again, one could consider a "least-trade-restrictiveness" test which, of course,
will not necessarily coincide with the "least-GATT-inconsistency" test.69
Aside from the greater difficulty of determining ordinally what greater and
lesser GATT-consistency means, the economic superiority of the test that requires
least damage to trade is manifest. In fact, the December 1991 Dunkel Draft of
the proposed Uruguay Round treaty adopted the latter test: it is built into the
Standards Code and also into the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Decision. It is also
the test used in the GATT Panel decision in 1992 on the Alcohol Beverages case
where the United States lost. The laws in five states that required a common
carrier to enforce their tax and alcohol policy were held to be unacceptable
because
the United States has not demonstrated that the common carrier
requirement is the least trade restrictive enforcement measure
available to the various states and that less restrictive measures,
e.g. record-keeping requirements of retailers and importers are not
sufficient for tax administration purposes.70
This test seems reasonable, of course. The objections to it amount mainly to
objections to the methods by which the Beverage Panel arrived at the judgment
that less-trade-restrictive measures to achieve the same objectives were
69Cf. Charnovitz., ibid., pp. 213-214. For the Thailand case, see GATT,
Basic Instruments and Selected Documents. 375/200 (Geneva, Switzerland). Also
see Esty, Greening the GATT. op. cit., page 48.
70Cited in Charnovitz, ibid., p. 214.
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available in that instance. But there are indeed inherent difficulties in
defining the set of alternative policies that, with differential trade impact,
would achieve identical environmental (or other domestic) objectives. It is hard
to imagine identical results on these objectives from alternative policies,
though similar results can sometimes be deemed possible (though, here too,
judgments will differ sharply in many cases).
In the end, any practical enforcement of the "least-trade-restrictive" test
for evaluating the acceptability of an environmental regulation or standard will
likely force the adjudicating Panel into evaluating, implicitly or explicitly,
tradeoffs between the cost in trade disruption and the cost in reaching the
environmental objective: a phenomenon and a problem that economists, who accept
free lunches but do not believe in them, have no difficulty recognizing.
The jurisprudence, by necessity if not by choice, will have to move in the
direction of evaluating and deciding upon the solution to such tradeoffs. Thus,
in the case of EC law, in the case involving Denmark's laws concerning disposable
beer cans, the European Court of Justice seems to have explicitly considered such
a tradeoff between the interests of "free movement of goods" (and consequent
trade benefits) and "environmental protection."71
It is natural therefore that environmentalists and trade experts who seem
occasionally to attach opposing weights to the environmental and the trade
benefits of any regulation or standard will worry about what weights the
adjudicating Panels would choose in reaching their decisions. If therefore
disputes are to arise between nations, and tests of "necessity" that imply
weighing alternative policies leading to different tradeoffs are to be utilized,
71Cf. Charnovitz, ibid., p. 215. Charnovitz calls this the
"proportionality" issue; but it is really a "tradeoff" issue.
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it is certainly proper for the environmentalists to seek improvements in the
dispute settlement process that would give them greater access in terms of the
ability to file written friends-of-the-court briefs and also make the Panel
procedures more transparent than hitherto at the GATT.
A complementary policy of prevention rather than cure would also be useful
as we move increasingly into this difficult and contentious area. The input of
"principally-affected" trading countries into the setting of domestic
environmental and other regulatory standards, such that the policy alternatives
are discussed and adopted in light of such input, would help to reduce conflict
to an irreducible minimum that the judicial process must address and resolve.
Instances of such international input into domestic setting of standards are not
lacking: the United States, worried by the trade-restrictive implications of EC
standards-setting procedures, has indeed gained some access to the EC processes.
But clearly more institutionalized and satisfactory procedures for doing so,
available to weak and not just to strong nations, would appear to be a most
useful innovation.
3. The Scientific-Test Issue
The use of scientific tests to determine whether a product can be
proscribed, even on a nondiscriminatory basis between imports and domestic
production, creates yet another important source of disagreement. Suppose that
the US uses Alar to spray apples and that the EC does not. Suppose then that,
faced with agitation from consumers who consider Alar-sprayed apples to be a
hazard to their health, the EC bans their sales. The US industry and government
can then be expected to demand that the EC justify, through the use of a
scientific test, its fear that Alar-sprayed apples are a hazard.
Although this case is hypothetical, the EC-US conflict on EC's proscription
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of hormone-fed beef is not. In this instance, the US beef producers that used
hormones and the biotech industry that had invented and now produced the hormones
were pitted against what they considered to be a wholly-unscientific fear of
hormone-fed beef. The US went to the length of trade retaliation under Section
301; the EC in the end did not counter-retaliate; and the matter was not taken
to the GATT dispute settlement process for adjudication, with both the EC ban and
the US retaliation continuing in place. Given the high probability that a
scientific test criterion would have been required by a GATT dispute settlement
Panel, it is likely that the EC would have lost the case.
But the case was an early-warning sign of the tension between commercial
and environmental interests on this issue. Admittedly, even hard science is not
hard enough most of the time. The many who are convinced of a hazard to their
health, no matter what the current preponderance of scientific opinion, might
well turn out to be right after all. Then again, even if scientists were agreed
on measuring the risk from any event or act of consumption or production, the
subjective reaction of different people to the objective risk may vary greatly
and, in fact, does.
It is tempting then to say: let any regulation pass, regardless of the
scientific test, no matter that it reduces another's access to one's market.
But we are back then to the "slippery slope" scenario. Without the restraining
hand of current science, the itch to indulge one's fears could be overwhelming.
The solution may then well be to institutionalize what in effect happened
with the hormone-fed beef case: have the scientific test; if you lose, "pay up"
(as the EC did) if you do not wish to change your regulation or standard; or
settle by shifting your regulation or standard so as to broadly move in the
direction of achieving your objective by alternative policies (e.g. by labeling
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hormone-fed beef as such rather than proscribing it altogether and then
undertaking education, propaganda and boycotts against its use).
Again, if the notion of "paying up" appears offensive to the
environmentalists because science should not stand in the way of our deeply-held
concerns, we would just urge them to undertake one thought experiment. We all
know from science today that AIDS does not spread through simple contact.
Suppose that our immigration policy nonetheless rules out HIV-infected
immigrants, even when refugees and family reunification are involved, because
large numbers of native Americans are sure (unscientifically) that such
admissions will spread AIDS to them. Would a typically liberal, activist
environmentalist agree to such a policy?
C. The Circumventing-Democracy Issue
We would be remiss if we did not also note the increasing appeal to some
environmentalists of the notion that "the process of negotiating international
agreements [as the GATT's Uruguay Round] is less subject to public scrutiny, and
therefore a threat to democratic accountability,72 and that "faceless" and
unelected bureaucrats at the GATT will overrule our democratically-enacted
environmental and other social regulations. Leaving aside the question whether
such regulations will be overturned--an issue that we just discussed at length--,
the question regarding democratic process is far more complex than the simplistic
denunciations that find their way into anti-GATT propaganda. In particular, we
72This was the issue addressed to a Panel of trade and legal scholars at
the Conference on "The Morality of Protectionism" at the New York University
Law School in November 1992. It is quoted in Robert Hudec's excellent
contribution, "'Circumventing' Democracy: The Political Morality of Trade
Negotiations," forthcoming in the Proceedings issue of the New York
University, Journal of International Law and Politics. 1993.
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would argue the following:
(i) It is inconsistent to hold simultaneously, as many do, that the Low
Standards of other countries should be countervailed by foreign NGOs and
governments which are "unelected" and "faceless" as far as these Low Standard
countries are concerned, while condemning the GATT Panel members, chosen by
democratic procedures multilaterally agreed among the Contracting Parties, as
"faceless" and "unelected."
(ii) Is it really correct to hold that one level of governance is more
"democratic" than another? After all, it is the Contracting Parties that have
chosen democratically the GATT Panel procedures.
(iii) Moreover, it is not correct to argue that the closer the level of
governance to the ground, the better the decision. If local governance were
dominant, Al Capone could flourish without the Feds, capital punishment would
thrive, land reforms in developing countries (legislated and enforced from the
top when grassroots activism is frustrated by the local power structure) might
go slower, and so on.
(iv) There is no reason to think that the GATT works any worse than the
national or local legislatures in these matters. Contrast the contribution of
the GATT, including its Panels, with the gift that the US Congress gave to the
world in 1934 with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff and is currently giving us with its
301 and Super 301 style championing of aggressive unilateralism.
(v) The current US position, opposed effectively by other Contracting
Parties, that environmental NGOs be allowed to participate in GATT Council
deliberations on Panel rulings is couched in terms of transparency and democracy.
But it raises compelling objections that presumably emerged during this debate:
(i) the NGOs should be able to participate via their own governments which
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represent them and other constituents in democratic governments; there is no
reason to think that their added participation is any more desirable than that
of consumer groups, protectionist lobbies, unions etc., all of whom can and do
compete for influence in national politics and hence on international policy
deliberations;
(ii) the environmental NGOs are not necessarily handicapped financially
vis-a-vis the other groups, and their organization and clout are
disproportionately greater than their finances since they can often successfully
claim the higher moral ground (e.g. we are "rescuing the dolphins" from the
rapacious multinationals; we are "saving the planet"), so they certainly do not
need a "second voice," when others are denied it, at the GATT Council; and
(iii) while there are indeed NGOs in the developing countries, the heavily-
financed ones are in the rich countries and will reflect their concerns,
priorities and views (e.g. protecting dolphins rather than aiding Mexico's tuna
industry to help Mexico's development and removal of poverty) ; the rich countries
would then have a double voice, when they can often drown out the voice of the
poor countries with just one voice, thus undermining the notion of democracy at
the international level.
V. Concluding Observations: Environmental Problems
with Transborder Externalities and Trade Questions
We conclude our exhaustive analysis of the case of purely domestic
environmental problems, and the associated demands for CCII harmonization and
eco-dumping countervailing duties et al., with a sketch of the policy problems
that arise in the context of transborder externalities. These are generally more
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complex in character than the ones which arise with purely domestic73 pollution
and more compelling as well. It may be useful, from a policy viewpoint, to
distinguish among two cases: (1) a special case where the problem is simplified
by assuming a single country that pollutes the other, raising questions of
response such as the use of trade barriers by the other; and (2) a general case
where the problem is truly global in character. A good example of the former is
US transmission of acid rain to Canada; an excellent example of the latter is
global warming, to which many countries contribute while all are affected by it
(though each in different degrees, and not all negatively).
A. One-wav Transmission of Pollution and Two Countries:
This case is helpful because it illustrates in a simple way the problem
raised by transborder externalities concerning the use of second-best trade
instruments by the injured country when the offending country does not implement
a first-best solution and uses its jurisdictional autonomy in the spirit of
malign neglect. The principal question then is whether a country that is being
damaged by pollution from another has the right to impose a trade restraint to
affect the exports, and hence production, and hence the pollution, of the other
73Some issues are, of course, similar to those raised in the case of
domestic environmental problems. Thus, we must ask again: how convincing is
the science being invoked to spur action? Ironically, some of those who attack
the use of science to attack environmental regulations in challenging
phytosanitary standards defend the use of science in urging action on global
problems. The fickle nature of science in these matters is evident from the
history of the ozone problem. Scientists in the US were in the forefront in
suggesting the link between CFCs and ozone depletion, leading in 1978 to the
prohibition of the use of CFCs in aerosol spray cans. The Europeans were
skeptical; so was the Reagan administration. The discovery of the big hole in
the ozone layer in Antarctica in 1984 turned almost everyone around, leading
to the Montreal Protocol in 1987 and the further change therein in 1990 to
eliminate CFCs by 2,000 AD.
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country that comes into one's area.74
Thus, suppose that the US is transmitting acid rain to Canada, thanks to
her C02-producing processes used in producing electricity in a CO2-intensive way
since the US electricity generation uses fossil fuel (whereas the Canadian
industry uses cleaner, hydroelectric processes). If the US refuses to tax her
electricity producers for the S02 pollution it generates, or refuses to
compensate Canada for the damage that is inflicted by the acid rain that is
transmitted to Canada by wind drift, then should Canada have the right to tax her
import of US electricity (and even of other US exports that are produced, using
the electricity that produces the acid rain and then transmits a fraction of it
to Canada)?
Modifying the GATT rules to explicitly allow for such a possibility would
make sense as a "second-best" solution since the offending party (the US in the
example) refuses to undertake a "first-best" solution. That also seemed to be,
as Charnowitz has noted, the position taken in some early and unofficial thinking
by the GATT Secretariat. Of course, the usual caveats about satisfying science
tests etc. would have to be noted and codified.75
The problem, of course, is that this type of trade remedy is generally
likely to be so weak for problems like acid rain that one may ask: is it worth
modifying the GATT/WTO to legitimate such trade actions? Thus, take the example
of acid rain itself. The generation of acid rain in the US, a fraction of which
comes across to Canada, is geographically concentrated, of course, at the border
7
*The theoretical analysis of this instrument is in Appendix I and, more
fully, in Markusen (1975).
75This would clearly be a case where the process that generates the
physical transborder externality is being objected to and a trade measure
against it is being legitimated, as distinct from the "values" objection to a
process as discussed earlier.
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whereas the import tariff would affect all electricity generation in the US;
moreover, the effect on S02 generation would be indirect, not direct through tax
on the process itself; then again, only a fraction of the acid rain generation
effect would get into the transmission. The tariff instrument would then be
extremely weak and the Canadian gain from its use in reducing the loss from the
acid rain is outweighed by the reduced gains from trade, i.e. the gains from
importing cheaper electricity from the US.76
B. Global Transborder Externalities
The chief policy questions concerning trade policy when global pollution
problems are involved instead, as with ozone layer depletion and global warming,
take a different turn related to the cooperative-solution-oriented multilateral
treaties that are sought to address them.77 They are essentially tied into
noncompliance ("defection") by members and "free riding" by nonmembers. Because
any action by a member of a treaty relates to targeted actions (such as reducing
CFCs or C02 emissions) that are a public good (in particular, that the benefits
are nonexcludable, so that if I incur the cost and do something, I cannot exclude
you from benefiting from it), the use of trade sanctions to secure and enforce
76This is the conclusion reached by Aparna Guha in a dissertation at
Columbia University, examining the options before Canada in relation to the
acid rain from the United States. She is currently studying the possibility
of a market in permits to use fossil fuels in US electricity generation where
Canada could bid and pay herself to reduce the acid rain being generated in
the US: this would require, of course, that the permits be segmented by the
States which generate the acid rain that comes across to Canada, else the cost
to Canada could become prohibitive. There is much excellent work on the acid
rain problem, both empirically and theoretically, including by Karl-Goran
Maler and his associates in Stockholm.
77Of course, the question of single-country use of a second-best tariff
policy can be raised here just as well as in the preceding case discussed
earlier, but this question has raised no interest in the global-pollution
context.
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compliance automatically turns up on the agenda.
At the same time, the problem is compounded because the agreement itself
has to be legitimate in the eyes of those accused of free riding or
noncompliance. Before those pejorative epithets are applied and punishment
prescribed in form of trade sanctions legitimated at the GATT/WTO, these nations
have to be satisfied that the agreement being pressed on them is efficient and,
especially, that it is equitable in burden-sharing.78 Otherwise, nothing
prevents the politically powerful (i.e. the rich nations) from devising a treaty
that puts an inequitable burden on the politically weak (i.e. the poor nations)
and then using the cloak of a "multilateral" agreement and a new GATT/WTO-
legitimacy to impose that burden with the aid of trade sanctions with a clear
conscience, invoking the white man's burden to secure the white man's gain.
This is why the policy demand, often made, to alter the GATT/WTO to
legitimate trade sanctions on Contracting Parties who remain outside of a treaty,
whenever a plurilateral treaty on a global environmental problem dictates it, is
unlikely to be accepted by the poor nations without safeguards to prevent unjust
impositions. The spokesmen of the poor countries have been more or less explicit
on this issue, with justification. These concerns have been recognized by the
rich nations.
Thus, at the Rio Conference in 1992, the Framework Convention on Climate
Change set explicit goals under which several rich nations agreed to emission
level-reduction targets (returning, more or less, to 1990 levels), whereas the
commitments of the poor countries were contingent on the rich nations footing the
bill.
Ultimately, burden-sharing by different formulas related to past emissions,
78Cf. Section VII, Appendix I on this question.
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current income, current population etc. are inherently arbitrary; they also
distribute burdens without regard to efficiency. Economists will argue for
burden-sharing dictated by cost-minimization across countries, for the earth as
a whole: if Brazilian rain forests must be saved to minimize the cost of a
targeted reduction in C02 emissions in the world, while the US keeps guzzling gas
because it is too expensive to cut that down, then so be it. But then this
efficient "cooperative" solution must not leave Brazil footing the bill!
Efficient solutions, with compensation and equitable distribution of the gains
form the efficient solution, make economic sense.
A step towards them is the idea of having a market in permits again, at the
world level: no country may emit C02 without having bought the necessary permit
from a worldwide quota. That would ensure efficiency79, whereas the
distribution of the proceeds from the sold permits would require a decision
reflecting some multilaterally-agreed ethical or equity criteria (e.g. the
proceeds may be used for refugee resettlement, UN peacekeeping operations, aid
dispensed to poor nations by UNDP, WHO fight against AIDs, etc.). This type of
agreement would have the legitimacy that could then provide the legitimacy in
turn for a GATT/WTO rule that permits the use of trade sanctions against free
riders.
79This efficiency is only in the sense of cost minimization. The number
of permits may, however, be too small or too large, and getting it right by




We consider a sequence of models to illustrate the trade policy
implications of bringing environmental considerations into contexts that differ
with respect to (i) the nature of pollution (e.g. purely domestic versus global),
(ii) whether or not the economy is a price taker in world markets, (iii) whether
or not pollution can be abated through expenditure of resources, and (iv) whether
global welfare or national welfare is the policy objective. In much of the
analysis pollution is modelled as a production externality which affects welfare.
In the last section we relate our analysis to that in the literature.
PURELY DOMESTIC POLLUTION
IA. Small Country: Purely Domestic Pollution: No Abatement Possible
For simplicity consider a two-commodity model with the production
transformation function X1 — F(X2) where XL is the output of good i. Pollution
P - P(X!, X2) = p(F, X2) . Clearly for any given production choice (Xlf X2) where
Xx — F(X2), pollution P is determined regardless of trade. As such since the
economy has no market power, free trade is optimal from a consumer perspective.
This implies in particular that, if the given production choice is fixed
at the production vector associated with the autarky optimum, opening the economy
to free trade in consumption cannot reduce welfare. As such, as long as
appropriate policy instruments are available to ensure the separation of
consumption from production, trading cannot hurt.
Now, allow instead a production response to trading opportunities.
Writing Y » Xx + nX2 -= F + TTX2 for income where TT is the world relative price of
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good 2 in terms of good 1, V(ir, Y, P) for the indirect utility function, the
first order condition for the optimal choice of production is given by80
V2 (Fi + *) + V3 (PiFi + P2) - 0 (1)
where the subscript i of a function denotes the partial derivative with respect
to its ith argument.
Of course if V3 - 0 so that pollution does not affect welfare, (1) reduces
to K - -F1 or world price - domestic marginal rate of transformation so that free
trade is optimal from a producer perspective as well. In the case where V3 < 0
so that pollution affects welfare adversely, (1) can be rewritten as
* + V3(P1F1 + P 2)A 2 - -Fi (2)
Now (F{F1 + P2) is the net marginal change in pollution as the output of good 2
increases: it is the sum of the direct marginal change P2 from the increase in
output of good 2 and the indirect marginal change PiFj from the fall Fx in output
of good 1 induced by the increase in the output of good 2. Thus if P1F1 + P2 is
negative (resp. positive) so that the net change in pollution from an increase
in the output of good 2 is negative (resp. positive), the domestic rate of
transformation of good 2 for good 1 is larger (resp. smaller) than the world
price of good 2, i.e. if an increase in the output of good 2 reduces (resp.
increases) pollution, since pollution is an uninternalized domestic externality,
the output of good 2 should be subsidized (resp. taxed) relative to its world
price. This optimal rate of tax or subsidy will in general be different in a
trading optimum as compared to autarky. Nonetheless welfare in a free trading
optimum will be no less than under autarky.
80In this appendix, unless otherwise stated, we will simply assume that
the relevant set of first order conditions indeed characterize a unique
solution to the optimization problem under consideration. We do not go into
the assumptions on the production, utility and pollution functions that will
ensure that this will be the case.
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This is a straightforward application of the standard theory of domestic
distortions to what, in the present instance, is a production externality.81
IB. Small Country: Purely Domestic Pollution: Abatement Possible bv Spending
Resources
Let Ka, La denote the amount of capital and labour respectively devoted to
abatement. Let K, L denote the aggregate endowment of capital and labor. Now
the transformation function is Xx = F(X2, K - Ka, L - La) and pollution is P -
P(Xlf X2, Ka, L a).
As before, with given Xlt X2, Ka, and La, clearly free trade is optimal from
a consumer perspective. As such, opening the economy to trade in consumption,
while keeping production at autarky optimum levels, cannot reduce welfare. The
indirect utility is as before V(w, Y, P) where Y - Xx + TTX2.
The first order conditions for the optimal (interior) choice of production
of X2 and of resources Ka, La devoted to abatement are:
V2(F! + TT) + V3 (PiFx + P2) = 0 (3)
V2F2 + V3P3 - 0 (4)
V2F3 + V3P4 - 0 (5)
First, (4) and (5) imply F2/F3 = P3/PA> i.e. the marginal rate of
substitution of capital and labour is the same in commodity production (i.e.
F2/F3) as in pollution abatement (i.e. P3/PA).
Second, (3) is the same as (1) so that the conclusion that if an increase
in output of 2 reduces (resp. increases) pollution it should be subsidized (resp.
taxed) relative to its world price remains even with abatement possibilities.
81Cf. Srinivasan (1987) and Bhagwati (1971).
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Only now, the effect of or pollution of an increase in output of 2 is evaluated
given the optimum levels of resources devoted to abatement.82
Finally, the result that welfare in a free trading optimum is no less than
under an autarky optimum, though in general the optimal production tax or subsidy
could be different in the two optima, continues to hold. Again this is a
straightforward implication of the standard theory of domestic distortions.
IIB. Large Country: Purely Domestic Pollution: Active trade policy with no
retaliation: Abatement feasible.
It should be evident from the analysis of the small-country model that, as
long as pollution is a purely domestic distortion, standard theory should go
through when a purely international distortion, namely, the ability to influence
the terms of trade (which is not internalized by private domestic agents) is
added. We confine ourselves to demonstrating this for the case with abatement
possible. The same results can be easily seen to hold for the case when abatement
is not possible.
Since terms of trade are now endogenous it is more convenient to work with
the direct utility function.
U(F(X2, K-Ka, L-La) + *(E2)E2, X2 - E2, P(F, X2, Ka, La))
where E2 represents the net exports of good 2 and w(E2) the average price (in
terms of good 1) per unit of good 2 exported. The choice variables are X2, E2,
Ka, La. The corresponding first-order conditions for an interior maximum of U
are
UjFi + U2 + U3(P1F1 + P2) - 0 (6)
82Note also that we do not have a reason to subsidize the use of
abatement technology.
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• U2 - 0 (7)
+ U3P3 - 0 (8)
-(Ui+UaPi) + U3P4 - 0 (9)
From (7) it is seen that the domestic marginal rate of substitution between
good 2 and good 1, i.e. U2/Ulf equals the marginal revenue (in terms of good 1)
per unit of exports of good 2 at the optimal level of exports. Thus V2/^i equals
the marginal terms of trade and differs from the average terms of trade by the
term TT1E2. The difference is the standard optimal tariff to exploit market
power.
From (8) and (9) it is clear that the marginal rate of substitution between
capital and labor in goods production, i.e. F2/F3 equals that in pollution
abatement, i.e. P3/p4. Rewriting equation (6) as
-F1 - U2/U! + U ^ P ^ + P2)/U! (10)
it is seen that the domestic marginal rate of transformation between goods 1 and
2, i.e. -Flt differs from the domestic marginal rate of substitution U2/Ui by the
addition of U3(P1F1+P2)/U1. By assumption, pollution hurts welfare so that U3,
the marginal utility of pollution, is negative while Ulf the marginal utility of
consumption of good 1, is positive. Thus the additional term is positive, zero
or negative according as the net addition to pollution of an increase in
production of good 2, i.e. (PiFj^  + P2) is negative, zero or positive. For
example, if the net addition to pollution is positive so that the additional term
is negative, it follows that, in addition to an optimal tariff (equation (7)) to
exploit market power in external markets, an optimum tax (of U3(P1F1 + P2)/U1 )
on the production of good 2 is needed to allow for the purely domestic distortion
of pollution.
It is evident that the feasibility of abatement does not affect the
72
algebraic form of equation (6) and (7) on which the above result (about the need
for an optimum tariff and a production tax) is based. As such the absence of the
possibility of abatement does not affect the result.83 Also it should be
obvious that welfare with trade restricted by an optimum tariff would be no less
than under autarky.
The rest of the world's offer curve to the home economy, i.e. TT(E2) , in the
above analysis in principle could be viewed as a function ?r(E2,T*) of home
exports E2 and foreign tariffs on home imports. Thus, given Cournot behaviour,
the home economy's optimal tariff will be a function (the home reaction function)
of the given foreign tariff T*. Similarly, there will be a foreign reaction
function linking their optimal tariff to the home economy's tariff. As is well
known since the work of Harry Johnson (1954), the intersection of the two
reaction functions is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the tariff game. And such
an equilibrium is not Pareto Optimal from a global perspective.
GLOBAL POLLUTION
III. Small Country: Global Pollution
We begin, in Sections III and IV, with national welfare maximization, and
then consider in Sections V-VIII questions relating to global Pareto Optimality
(i.e. "world welfare").
Assume now that the pollution is global, i.e. its effect cuts across (some
or all) national borders. In this case, the pollution function may be rewritten
as P(FU2,K-£a,L-La)+ Xf, Xz+ X2*, Ka + K*, La + L,*) where the starred variables
83Of course, the precise values of the optimum tariff and subsidy would
in general differ depending on whether or not abatement is feasible.
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X£, Ka*> L* respectively denote the output of good i (i—1,2) and the capital and
labour devoted to abatement in the rest of the world.
Implicit in this formulation are two strong assumptions: first, only global
levels of outputs, and not their distribution between countries, affect global
pollution; second, only global expenditure of resources on abatement, and not
their distribution between countries, matters. The latter in effect postulates
the same technology of abatement among countries in the sense that at any level
of aggregate resources devoted to abatement, the marginal reduction in pollution
achieved by a marginal increase in domestic resources devoted to abatement is the
same as that achieved by a marginal increase in foreign resources devoted to
abatement. But of course this does not necessarily imply that the same amount
of resources will be devoted to abatement at home and abroad in any equilibrium.
In section VIII below we relax these assumptions.
Since by assumption a small country cannot affect the prices at which it
trades with the rest of the world through its trade policy, there is no channel
by which it can affect the commodity or factor prices in the rest of the
world.84 If we assume Cournot behaviour in that the small country takes the
rest of the world's outputs and pollution abatement resources as given, it is
easily shown that the results of case IB continue to hold: free trade is optimal
8
*Even though the trade flows of a small economy by definition have no
influence on the terms at which the flows take place, such flows could
influence the output in the rest of the world. This is best seen in a
Ricardian model in which the small open economy specializes in producing its
exportable while the rest of the world (ROW) is incompletely specialized and
the equilibrium world prices are the autarky prices of the ROW. With the
opening of trade with the small economy, ROW still consumes its autarky
consumption bundle while its production adjusts to accommodate the trade flows
from the small economy. Although policy-induced changes in the trade flows of
the small economy do not affect equilibrium world prices, they do affect the
production in ROW and, hence, pollution, if pollution is a by-product of
production.
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and the domestic marginal rate of substitution between capital and labour should
be the same in goods production and pollution abatement.
However, the assumption of Cournot behaviour is rather artificial in this
case. It is more natural to assume that if the country is 'small', it will
behave as if its shares of global outputs and global resources devoted to
abatement are negligible. Thus it will treat pollution P as if it is a constant
P that cannot be influenced by its action. Clearly, it is optimal for such a
country not to devote any resources to pollution abatement, i.e. it will free-
ride on the rest of the world's expenditure of resources for abatement. It
follows that if the trading system consisted a large number of small countries
in this sense, no country will spend any resources on abatement: this is the
analogue of the "tragedy of the commons" in the use of common property resources.
IV. Large Country: Pollution Global: Cournot behaviour with respect to both
tariffs and resource allocation for abatement abroad.
For simplicity consider a trading world of two countries. For any given
level of foreign tariff T* and resource allocation for abatement K*, L*, the home
economy's terms of trade ir depends on its own exports E2. Thus the direct
utility of the home economy could be written as
U[F(X2, K - Ka, L - La) + E2TT(E2, T*) , X2 - E2, P]
where P = P[F(X2,K-Ka,L-La) + X{, X2 + X2, Ka + K*, La + La ] . Note that, since the
pollution is now global, the utility function is different from that in case IB
in so far as it additionally includes foreign outputs that generate pollution and
foreign inputs that abate it (since both determine the amount of foreign
pollution).
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The first order conditions for an interior maximum of U with respect to X2,
E2, Ka, La are:
UiFx + U2 + U3 (PiFi + P2) - 0 (10)
Ui(*iE2 + *) - U2 - 0 (11)
-(Ux+ UaP^Fa + U3P2 - 0 (12)
-(Ui+ U3P!)F3 + U3P4 - 0 (13)
As is to be expected, given Cournot behaviour (concerning both foreign
tariffs and resource abatement expenditures), these are exactly the same
algebraically as equations (6) - (9). In other words, corresponding to each
specified (X?, *2\ T\ K*, L*) , we have a home output X2(Xf, *2\ T \ Xa\ La*) , optimal
tariff T(Xi, x£, T*, K*, La) and home expenditure of resources
Ka(Xi, X2\ T \ ^a, L a ) , La(^i, ^ 2, r\ Xa*, La) . These three represent the home
reaction functions to foreign outputs X± and x£, (X± and X2 are on the foreign
transformation function, so that only one of them is independent) tariff T*, and
resources K*, L* allocated for abatement. It should be noted that, unless the
utility function is additively separable in pollution, the domestic MRS l^/u^
will be a function of foreign outputs and abatement resources. As such, from
(11) , it follows that the domestic optimal tariff will be a function not only of
foreign tariff as usual, but also of foreign outputs and abatement resources.
Analogously one defines foreign reaction as function of given values of the
home outputs, tariff and resource allocation for abatement. The 'intersections'
of the home and foreign reaction functions represent the Nash equilibrium values
of outputs in the two countries and TN, T*N, K*, K*", La, LaN. As is well-known,
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such Nash equilibria are not Pareto Optimal.85
V. Global Pareto Optimal Allocations
Pareto Optimal allocations, on the other hand, are derived by maximizing
a non-negatively weighted sum of the welfares of the two countries. It is more
convenient to write the two utility functions as UtC^, C2, P] andt/*(C1*,C2*,P)
where Cif C± represent the consumption of commodity i (i - 1,2) and pollution
P = P[*!+*;, X2+X;t K&+KZ, La+L&*] (14)
Xx =F(X2, K-Ka, L-LJ (15)
Xi - F*(*2\ K'-Kj, L-Ll) (16)
Market clearance implies
C1 + C[ = Xt* X{ (17)
and C2 + C2 - X2 + X2 (18)
Maximization of aU + (l-a)U* (where 0 < a < 1) with respect to Clt C2,
Ci,C2, X2, X2, Ka, K*, La, L* subject to (17) and (18) after substituting (14),
(15), (16) into U and U* yields the following first order conditions for an
85Since the home (resp. foreign) country takes the foreign (resp. home)
country's outputs and resources allocated for abatement as given, each
country's reaction function with respect to the variables it chooses (X2 , Ka
and La for the home country and X2,K*,L* for the foreign country) are
functions of the values of the variables for the other country taken as given.
Nash equilibrium is a mutually consistent set in the sense that each country's
choices as obtained by substituting the other country's choices in its
reaction function, when substituted into the latter's reaction functions
yields the latter's choices. Thus X2(Xi",X2*V,T*",K*",L*") etc. when
substituted in the reaction function X2 () will yield back ^T2N and vice
versa. We are assuming that such Nash equilibria exist. The existence issue
is a complex one.
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interior maximum86:
aUx - X1 - 0 (19)
aU2 - A2 - 0 (20)
(l-a)y; - Ax - 0 (21)
(l-a)t/2* - A2 = 0 (22)
[a!73 + (l-a)I/3*](P1F1+P2) + AXFX + A2 = 0 (23)
[aU3 + (l-a)[/3*](P1F1%P2) + A X F ; + A2 = 0 (24)
[a[/3 + (l-a)[/3*]P3 - (A1+ay3P1)F2 = 0 (25)
[aU2 + (l-a)a3*]PA - (A^a^P^Fa = 0 (26)
[aU3 + (l-a)t/3*]P3 - (A1+(l-a)I73*P1)F2* = 0 (27)
[aU3 + (l-a)l/3*]PA - (A1+(l-a)t/3P1)F3* = 0 (28)
From (19)-(22), it follows that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS)
between goods 1 and 2 in consumption is the same in the two countries, i.e.
^2/^1 = ^2/^1 = ^2/^1 regardless of the value a. Thus, from a consumer
perspective, there is free trade in a Pareto Optimum.
However, from (23) and (24), it is seen that the marginal rate of
transformation (MRT) between goods 1 and 2 at home, -Fj equals
A2/Ai + 1/AX [aU3 + (l-a)y3][P1F1+P2] ; a n d a b r o a d , -F^ e q u a l s
*2/Ai + [l/xi][aU3 + (l-a)^] [Pi^i + Pz] • ^ns MR1 a t h o m e (resp. abroad) differs
from the common MRS by [1/AJ [aU3 + (l-a)i/3 ] [ P ^ + P2] (resp.
86Aj_ and A2 are the Lagrangean multipliers associated with constraints
(17) and (18) respectively; these are shadow prices in global welfare units of
good 1 and 2 respectively.
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[1/AJ [aU3 + (l-a)U3*] [ P ^ + P2] ). This term is easily interpreted:
[aU3 + (l-a)!/^] is the global welfare effect of a marginal increase in pollution,
i.e. shadow price of a unit of pollution again in global welfare units; \1 is,
as noted earlier, the shadow price of good 1. Thus the ratio of these two terms
represents the global shadow 'price' of a marginal unit of pollution in units of
good 1 and at a Pareto Optimum it is the same in the two countries. The term
(PiFx + P2) is the net pollution effect of a marginal increase in the production
of good 2 at home. The product of all three terms is thus in units of good 1 per
unit of good 2 and represents the trade-off between the pollution of the two
goods at home through the relative global welfare effects they have through
pollution. Thus, at a Pareto Optimum, the home MRT between the two goods must
equal the sum of their relative welfare effects through their consumption, i.e.
2^/^ 1» anc* their relative welfare effects through pollution which is the second
term. An analogous condition applies in the foreign country.
If we interpret the difference between MRS and MRT as a shadow production
tax or subsidy on good 2 it is seen from (23) and (24) that this tax/subsidy
would be the same in the two countries if Fx = F^ at an optimum, i.e. if the MRT
is the same in the two countries. At the same time, it is evident from (25) -
(28) that the marginal rate of substitution between capital and labour is the
same in the two countries in all activities, whether production or abatement.
Thus, if we interpret the marginal rate of substitution as the shadow wage-rental
ratio, it is the same in the two countries. With shadow commodity prices the
same, factor price equalization follows. If the available technology of
production of goods is the same in the two countries, then with factor price
equalization the shadow production tax/subsidy rates will be the same in the two
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countries. The global Pareto Optimal solution will require tax harmonization!
The first order conditions relating to MRT in the two countries, taken
together with the fact that MRS is the same in the two countries, imply that free
trade combined with an appropriate production tax or subsidy is the appropriate
policy associated with a Pareto Optimum. However, in general if the value of
a is set exogenouslv. trade between the countries need not be balanced so that
a lump sum income transfer from the country running the trade surplus to that
running the deficit would be required to support the chosen Pareto Optimum. But
a can be chosen endogenously to ensure that no transfers are needed, i.e. trade
is balanced. A heuristic argument for the existence of such an a is as follows
(the existence of such a unique a is shown for a special case in Section VIII).
Set a - 1 so that the foreign economy's welfare receives a zero weight. Clearly
at the associated Pareto Optimum foreign economy in effect transfers its entire
income to the home economy. The reverse happens when a is set at zero. Thus,
by continuity, at some a between 0 and 1, the required transfer will be zero.
However the implementation of the associated Pareto Optimum involves the use of
information on the welfare effect of pollution in both countries for devising the
appropriate tax-subsidies in each.
A comparison of the first order condition relating to home MRT with the
analogous conditions in the Cournot-Nash case IV makes it clear that, in the
latter, each country ignores the effect of its production choice on foreign
welfare through pollution so that the resulting Nash equilibrium cannot be Pareto
Optimal.
VI. Deviant Behaviour bv One Country and Global Pareto Qptimalitv
The implementation of the global Pareto Optimum with or without transfers
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involves the use of a set of optimal production taxes or subsidies in each
country and the expenditure of appropriate levels of resources on pollution
abatement. Suppose for instance, however, that one of the countries, say the
home country, is required to devote a positive amount of capital and labour to
abatement in supporting the Pareto Optimum. If it deviates, and for example,
does not spend any resources on abatement, we may ask whether a restricted Pareto
Optimum is still attainable. Will it involve the use of trade policy?
Referring back to the first order condition (19)-(28) characterizing a
Pareto Optimum, we see now that conditions (25) and (26) relating to the capital
Ka and labour La devoted to abatement by the home country no longer apply. But
the remaining conditions continue to hold. Therefore, free trade along with an
appropriate set of production taxes and subsidies continues to support a
restricted Pareto Optimum.
Of course, the reason why a restricted Pareto Optimum is achievable with
free trade in spite of the home economy devoting no resources for abatement is
obvious: since by assumption the externality of pollution arises from production,
no deviation from free trade with respect to consumption is called for.
Indeed this argument goes even further. Suppose, for instance, that for
whatever reason the home economy not only devotes no resources for abatement but
also chooses production levels different from those associated with an
unrestricted Pareto Optimum. This means that conditions (23), (25) and (26) no
longer apply. However, (19)-(22) continue to apply so that free trade with
respect to consumption continues to be optimal. And since (24) still applies,
the foreign economy has to levy an optimal production tax or subsidy to sustain
this further restricted Pareto Optimum. The home economy can of course sustain
its deviant behaviour through a variety of means.
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It should be noted that, from the perspective of a global Pareto Optimum,
countries are symmetric. As such which country, namely the home or the foreign
country, deviates in its behaviour is immaterial to the characterization of the
restricted Pareto Optimum. In the above analysis, if the foreign, rather than
the home, country does not devote as much resources as it should in supporting
an unrestricted Pareto Optimum, conditions (27) and (28) rather than (25) and
(26) no longer apply. But this does not affect the conclusion that free trade
along with an appropriate set of production taxes and subsidies support a
restricted Pareto Optimum.
VII. Shadow Factor Price Equalization
In the model of Section V, the shadow factor prices are equalized at the
chosen Pareto Optimum: whether or not there is international factor mobility is
therefore irrelevant. However, such shadow factor price equalization need not
always occur. The considerations that lead to the shadow factor price
equalization in Section V are:
(1) at a global welfare optimum in which a positive amount of each
commodity is consumed in each country, the shadow commodity prices for consumers
(in global welfare units) have to be the same in both countries;
(2) the shadow price of pollution (in welfare units) is also the same in
both countries;
(3) if each country is devoting a positive amount of each factor to
pollution abatement, then because one country's factor is a perfect substitute
for the other country's in pollution abatement, and the price of pollution is the
same in the two countries; the marginal value of each factor in pollution
abatement must be the same in the two countries; and it follows then that the
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shadow price of each factor in global welfare units is equalized between
countries; also, because the consumer shadow price of each commodity in welfare
units is the same in the two countries, we see by taking the ratio of shadow
factor price to the shadow consumer price of either commodity that the
equalization of shadow factor prices in commodity units follows.
Thus, shadow factor prices (in any commodity unit) cannot be equalized if
any of the above considerations do not apply. For example, if consumers in the
home country do not consume the first commodity while foreign consumers do, the
marginal rate of substitution of the two goods in consumption at home will differ
between countries. As such, factor prices in commodity units could differ
between countries even if they are equalized in welfare units.
VII. Efficiency and Equity: Possible Conflicts
1. The Analytical Argument
A globally Pareto Optimal allocation of resources is efficient in two
senses. It is distributionally efficient in the sense that there is no other
feasible allocation that could make one country better off without making some
other country worse off. It is also productively efficient in the sense that the
allocation across countries of production, and hence of pollution generated by
production, is such that there is no other feasible allocation that will increase
the consumption of some commodity in a country without reducing the consumption
of any other commodities anywhere or increasing pollution, or alternatively will
reduce pollution without at the same time reducing the consumption of some
commodity somewhere. The pure gain in moving to an efficient allocation from an
inefficient one could be distributed among countries to make at least one country
better off without hurting others.
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While a Pare to Optimal allocation is thus efficient, it need not be
equitable. For example, an allocation that uses all of the world's resources to
maximize just one country's welfare is Pareto Optimal but hardly equitable. On
the other hand, an equitable allocation in the sense of maximizing a global
welfare function that incorporates equity considerations would also be Pareto
Optimal as long as the global welfare function is increasing in each country's
welfare. Thus, such an equitable allocation is necessarily Pareto Optimal and
hence efficient in both senses.
The arguments above suggest that there needs to be no conflict between
equity and efficiency. Indeed this would be the case if instruments exist that
would sustain an equitable Pareto Optimal allocation. For example, a market
mechanism for resource allocation, supplemented by lump sum transfers as needed
between countries, could sustain such an allocation. However if transfers are
infeasible, then an equilibrium market allocation (without transfers) need not
be equitable. Then achieving a more equitable allocation will involve in this
case the sacrifice of efficiency in one or both senses.
2. Illustrations
(1) A suggestive illustration of a possible conflict between efficiency and
distributional equity is shown in Figure 1. The marginal cost of pollution
abatement in the US is seen to be above that in Brazil at all levels of pollution
to be abated up to P. As such, it will be cost efficient for only Brazil to
engage in pollution abatement up to P. For Brazil also to bear the full cost
of such abatement would be deemed (at least by Brazilians) as inequitable!
(2) Consider also the following simple version of the model of section V.
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of virgin forest. A hectare of this forest, if cleared and planted with wheat
(resp. rice), will produce 1 ton of wheat (resp. rice), and release n (resp. /x*)
litres of pollutants into the environment. Left as forest land, on the other
hand, that hectare would have removed 7 (resp. 7*) litres of pollutants from the
environment.
Home utility U is given by
U - fljLog Cx + d2 Log C2 + 03 Log (P-P) (29)
where 1 > d± > 0, 03 — 1 - 61 - 62, Cj is the consumption of wheat, C2 is the
consumption of rice, P is the quantity of (net) pollutants in the economy andP
is the maximum amount of pollutants consistent with survival. Analogously,
foreign utility U* if given by
U* = $1 Log Cl + 62 Log C2 + e; Log (P-P) (30)
where 1 > B{ > 0, 0*3 - l-${ - 62 .
Clearly, we have in this model:
Cx + C{ = Xx = output of wheat (31)
C2 + C2 = X2 • output of r ice (32)
P =
 ltXl* fXl * i
+ (7* + »*)X2* -JH ~ 1*H* (33)
As in Section V, Pareto Optimal allocations are derived by maximizing [aU
+ (l-a)U*] for 0 < a < 1. The resulting production, pollution, consumption and
welfare levels can be characterized as follows.
In this simple model, the efficient combinations of Xlt X2 and P (in the
production sense) are given by (33) where obviously 0 < X1 < H and 0 < X2 < H* .
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It can be shown that the efficient values of Xlt X2 and P associated with the
Pareto Optimum corresponding to a are given by87:
\~Q j./1 -/>}fl* — — —
-J: \[P + /iff + /i*ff*] (34)
7* *H"
[P + /iff .+ /i'ff* (35)
P-P = [a$z*a-*)*l] [P + »H + /i'ff*] (36)
The consumption of wheat and rice in the two countries in the Pareto Optimum is
given by:
±; C1 - (37)
a$.
I ^
The welfare levels U and U* in the Pareto Optimum are given by
U = (61+e2)Loga + 63Log(a63 + (l-a)0*3) +






87It is assumed that the parameters and endowments are such that the
feasibility constraints Xi < H and X2* ^  ff* hold.
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The shadow prices (in global welfare units) of goods 1, 2 and 'clean' air (i.e.
P-P) for consumers are, respectively:
(a*!*) (41)
Note that the shadow prices do not depend on a. Two further observations are in
order.
(1) It can be easily shown now that as a increases from zero to 1, U
increases and U* decreases. Eliminating o between (39) and (40) yields the
utility possibility frontier of U* as a function of U. The value of consumption
at home (resp. abroad) viz. A^! + A2C2 (resp. ^iCi+X2C2*) exceeds disposable
income AjXi (resp. A2A2) by a62-(l~a)6{ (resp. (l-a)6{ - a82))• Thus an income
transfer of ad2 - (l-cO^i from country 2 to country 1 is implicit in the above
Pareto Optimum. No transfer will be required only for a = &\/G\^62. [The reason
that consumer disposable income is the value of production at consumer prices is
that lump sum tax or subsidy needed to finance the wedge between consumer and
producer prices has to be subtracted (or added) to the value of production at
producer prices (i.e. income at factor cost) to arrive at disposable income at
market prices.]
(2) Inspection of (34) - (36) also reveals that if dL=dl (i-1,2,3) so that
both countries have identical tastes, efficient production and pollution levels
(Xlt X2 and P) are independent of a. Thus the choice of a affects only the
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distribution of the fixed outputs of Xi and X£ between the two countries for
consumption purposes. In this case, the utility possibility frontier is given
by
U* = (0!+02) Log [i-e-(*-U)/('i*'2)j + 5 > -*>*U*6 (42)
where 6 - *i[Log 6X - Log(7+/i)] + 62 [Log $2 - Log(7+/0] + 63 + Log(P+/iff+/i**0 •
It can be seen from (39) - (40) that as a -* 0, U -> -« and U* -»• 5 and as a -*• 1,
U -+ 6 and U* -»• -«. In fact U* is a concave function of U as depicted in Figure
2 for the case 6 > 0. It is seen that 6 represents the maximal utility that
either country would achieve if global resources are used to maximize only its
utility--in other words, the weight placed on the other country's utility in the
global welfare function is zero. With the countries being identical in tastes,
this maximal utility is the same for both countries.
We may now use this simple model, with the added simplification of
identical tastes88, to illustrate efficiency-equity conflicts in two different
ways.
(1) Suppose first that income transfers between the countries are
infeasible so that the only feasible Pareto Optimal allocation is that
corresponding to a - ^1/(^1+^2) (point N in Figure 2 which assumes identical
tastes). If, say, the welfare UN of the home economy at N is deemed too low and
an increase of it to UM is deemed desirable, had transfers been feasible, the
point M on the utility possibility frontier would have been the optimal way (i.e.
with the least loss of foreign welfare) of achieving such an increase. With
transfers infeasible, the welfare of the foreign economy would have to be reduced
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below UM (say to t/M*) for achieving such an increase. Thus the loss (£/„ - t/M*)
is the loss from distributional inefficiency (in departing from Pareto
Optimality) incurred in order to achieve equity, given that transfers are
infeasible.
(2) However, the no-transfer Pareto Optimal allocation N might be deemed
unsatisfactory for a reason other than its being inequitable; the associated
global pollution levels may be viewed as "too high." This might happen if it is
believed that one or both counties attach 'too low' a value to clean air in their
preferences. In the context of out simple model, if preferences are the same in
the two countries, a natural way to express this -concern is to set an upper boundP
on pollution levels. Now from (36) it is seen that
P = P - (a03 + (l-a)03)(P+/iff+/**#*) . If tastes are identical so that 93= 93, then
recall that P is independent of a and equals P - 03(P+/*tf+/**#*) . If this exceeds
P, then there is no feasible Pareto Optimum with or without transfers that can
A A
achieve the upper bound P. If it is less than or equal to P, the upper bound
is respected at all Pareto Optima.
Let us consider the case where P-63(P+iiH+fi*H*)>P so that the upper bound
represents a binding constraint. Of course, if we give up all production and
consumption, net pollution P will be negative since the pollutant-absorbing
capacity of the virgin forests will come into full play then. As such, it is
A
feasible to meet the bound P by reducing production relative to the levels at
a Pareto Optimum. It can then be shown that the efficient way of achieving P
without transfers is to reduce the output of Xx and X^ by the same proportion so
89
'0
 v />v*0 _.i____ vOthat X1 = fiXf, X2 = 0X2 where Xj and X20 are the values given by (34) and (35) and
89 Clean air, i.e. P-P, goes up relative to P-P° by the
factor I —. — I. This reduces the welfare of each country by the same amount
-(01 + #2) L°g P ~ 03 [^g (1-0(1-03)) " L°g 03]- While such a reduction is
efficient in meeting the bound P on pollution, the incidence might be viewed as
inequitable, if the post-reduction welfare level of one of the countries is
relatively low. Once again, meeting the bound and being equitable at the same
time will then mean deviating from efficiency.
What happens in the general case in which the two countries do not have
identical tastes so that $3 * 6^7 It is then seen from (36) that pollution P is
an increasing (resp. decreasing) function of a if B^> 03 (resp. 6$< 03) . This
is not surprising since 83 (resp. #3) is analogous to the 'share' of clean air
in the home economy's spending and, as a increases, the home economy's share in
world spending increases. Hence, if the 'share' of clean air in the home
economy's spending is less than that of the foreign economy, pollution increases
89Its efficiency can be demonstrated by showing that this solution
satisfies the conditions for Pareto Optimality subject to the requirements
that pollution does not exceed P and there are no transfers. In particular,
we can show that shadow cost of pollution in global welfare units will be the
same in the two countries, though higher than its value at the no-transfer
Pareto Optimum without a binding upper-bound constraint on pollution.
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as a greater share of world spending accrues to the home economy.
Now, for concreteness, assume that £3 > 63 so that pollution increases with
a. Then, as long as there exists an o (0<o<l) at which pollution equals P,
pollution will be less than P for all a in the interval 0 < a < a . Of course,
unless the no-transfer value of a, i.e. &\/(9\+d2) is less than a, the boundP
cannot be met at a Pareto Optimal allocation if transfers are ruled out:
efficiency will have to be sacrificed again in the interest of equity.
Our analysis of this model has then illustrated the following key
propositions:
(i) As long as lump sum income transfers between countries are feasible,
it is possible to achieve a resource allocation that is at the same time
distributionally efficient in the sense that relative to it, any other allocation
will make at least one country worse off in terms of consumer welfare,
productively efficient in the sense that relative to it in any other allocation
there will be less output of at least one commodity or greater pollution, and
equitable in the sense of maximizing a global welfare function that incorporates
distributional equity among countries while being an increasing function of each
country's welfare.
(ii) If such transfers are infeasible, at least one of the above three
desiderata have to be given up. For example, a distributionally and productively
efficient allocation without transfers was shown to exist that was not deemed
equitable. Achieving equity then involves a sacrifice of efficiency in both
senses.
(iii) Equity was judged in (i) and (ii) by a global welfare function that
was solely a function of the welfare of consumers in each country as perceived
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by them. In other words, the welfare evaluations of each country's consumers
were respected. If, for example, these evaluations are deemed inappropriate
because they attach too little weight to global pollution, then an efficient
allocation without transfers that is equitable [in the sense of (i)] may not be
satisfactory from the perspective of a global welfare function which overrides
consumer-weighing of global pollution. Once again, to achieve a satisfactory
allocation, either efficiency or equity in the sense of (i) or both have to be
given up.
VIII. Country-Specific Pollution Generation and Abatement
As noted earlier, the analysis above of global pollution assumed that the
outputs of two countries (resp. the resources devoted to pollution abatement)
were perfect substitutes for each other in the generation of pollution (resp. in
abatement). This assumption is easily relaxed. Consider again the case of
global Pareto Optimality of Section V. Let the pollution function (14) be
replaced by:
P =P[F(X2,K-Ka,L-La),X2,Ka,La,F*(X;tK*-K;,L*-L;),XZ,K;,L;] (43)
First order conditions (19) - (22) still hold, and as such free trade with
respect to consumption continues to be optimal. Conditions (23), (25) and (26)
still hold (recall that subscript i of P continues to denote the partial
derivative with respect to its ith argument, except P now has eight, instead of
four, arguments). Equation (24) is replaced by [aI/3 + (l-a)[/3 ] [P5Fi+P6]+A1F1*+A2=0 .
Equation (27) and (28) continue to hold with P3 replaced by P7 and P4 by P8.
The only significant result that is different from Case V is that while
within each country the marginal rate of substitution between capital and labour
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is the same in goods production and pollution abatement, this common rate is not
in general the same in the two countries. As such, the factor price equalization
result need no longer hold. Also, with the outputs and resources devoted to
pollution abatement in the two countries not being perfect substitutes for each
other respectively in pollution generation and abatement, the efficiency-equity
conflict discussed in Section VII is more likely.
EARLIER LITERATURE
IX. Previous Contributions of Relevance to our Analysis
There is a significant volume of scholarly literature on trade and the
environment, most of it in the last three years or so.90 The literature is
diverse in incorporating environmental considerations into economic models and
in the policy questions addressed. It is beyond our scope to provide a critical
survey and assessment of this literature.
Before discussing the two contributions most closely related to this paper,
however, it is worth pointing out that we have mostly confined our analysis to
"first best" policies in a context where environmental externalities or other
distortions are present. We did so primarily because it is well known that (1)
when a number of distortions are present, removing or reducing a subset of them
need not be welfare-improving and that whether it is or not would depend on the
specific circumstances; and (ii) when first-best policies are infeasible, other
policies might exist which will improve welfare over laissez-faire, but in
general the ranking of such policies according to the net welfare improvement
90Among the important contributions, aside from those reviewed below, are
Lloyd (1992), Snape (1992) and Baumol and Oates (1988). There are many others
on issues such as the "race to the bottom", which are not addressed
intensively in this paper but are the foci of other authors in this Project.
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they bring about is not possible (while of course in particular circumstances it
might be).
In the literature, a frequently-posed question is whether moving from
autarky to free trade would be welfare-improving. In situations where trade-
environment interactions are present and, of course, answers vary depending on
assumptions about other policies. This is just another illustration of the first
of the two well-known results stated above. After all, the welfare superiority
of free trade over autarky depends on the absence of other distortions.
The contributions that come closest to our paper are by Markusen (1975)
(1976). Markusen (1975) models pollution much in the same way as we do except
that, in his case, the production of only one of the two commodities (the same
one in each country) generates global pollution and no abatement is possible.
His analysis of 'first-best' policies for maximizing national welfare is the same
as for our case IV of a large country but without abatement possibilities: an
optimum tariff combined with a production tax is first-best optimal.
He then considers the case when the first-best combination is infeasible
and in turn examines the use of consumption taxes only, tariffs only and
production taxes only, as second-best policy instruments. He finds that the
formulae for the calculation of some second-best instrument contains components
of opposite algebraic signs so that taken together they lead to an ambiguous sign
for the instrument. This means, first, that whether the instrument will be a tax
or subsidy or neither (i.e. laissez-faire) will depend on the numerical balance
between the positive and negative components, a balance that can only be decided
empirically. Second, even if a second-best instrument has an unambiguous sign,
it does not mean that its use will produce a superior welfare outcome compared
to another instrument whose second-best value is of ambiguous sign. This is an
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illustration of the second of the well-known results stated above: second-best
policy rankings are circumstance-dependent.
Markusen (1976) models pollution the same way as Markusen (1975). But now
the policy issues are considered, not from the perspective of a single large
country which faces no retaliation or ignores it even if it is possible, but in
the context of two countries which are 'small' relative to the rest of the world
from the perspective of commodity trade but whose production-generated pollution
affects the welfare of both. Each government has production and trade taxes as
policy instruments at their disposal.
Markusen first solves for the optimum tax structure for each when it takes
the other's tax structure as given (Cournot behaviour) thus leading to a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium tax structure in the usual fashion. The Cournot-Nash
equilibrium is then compared with two types of cooperative equilibria--one
without transfer payments and the other with transfer payments. Three
conclusions are derived. First, for any distribution of world resources, there
exists some set of allocations that make both countries better off relative to
some sub-optimal equilibrium. Second, in the absence of transfer payments, there
exists a set of cooperative solutions which achieve such an allocation. Third,
if transfer payments are permitted, Pareto Optimal allocations that make both
countries better off relative to the Cournot equilibrium are attainable. These
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